JC History Tuition Online - What does the flying geese model suggest - Asian Tiger Economies Notes

What does the flying geese model suggest?

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Paper 1: Understanding the Global Economy (1945-2000)
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 3: Rise of Asian Tigers from 1970s to 1990s [South Korea and Taiwan] 

The Flying Geese model
According to the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu, Asian economies could grow based on a ‘flying geese model’. (FG model). Akamatsu noted that ‘Wild geese fly in orderly ranks forming an inverse V, just as airplanes fly in formation‘. After Japan achieved rapid economic recovery in the post-WWII years, it took the lead in economic development, whereas its neighbouring countries like Taiwan and South Korea followed suit.

During the 1930s, a Japanese economist, Kaname Akamatsu, initially sketched out a long span of history involving the evolutionary interrelationships of a developing Asian country (Japan) with the advanced West. His interest was to examine how developing countries in general may catch up with the advanced ones through their mutual interactions.

[…] Akamatsu presents a stylized four-stage model of evolving trade patterns of a typical developing country along its development process (catching-up), where the existing manufactured products are clustered into two broad categories: “consumer goods” and “capital goods”.

An excerpt from “The Asian Developmental State and the Flying Geese Paradigm” by the United Nations Conferenceo n Trade and Development.

Application on Asian economies
Although the FG model was developed in the 1930s, academics have based their research on this model in subsequent decades. While Japan was at the forefront of economic development in Asia, the ‘four tiger’ economies, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, played catch up.

After the 1970s, when Japan moved into an upper ladder of technological-intensive sectors such as the automobile industry and machinery after the first energy crisis in 1973-74, Taiwan and Korea kept chasing behind Japan’s footstep by moving to an upper ladder of technological sophistication with some varieties in the second phase; while Korea developed its brand name of automobiles, Taiwan, due to the limit of domestic market for scale economy, chose to develop auto parts and machinery tools instead of manufacturing the whole passenger cars.

An excerpt from “A Century of Development in Taiwan: From Colony to Modern State” by Peter C. Y. Chow.

For Taiwan, the government emulated Japan by focusing on labour-intensive production and exported to industrialised economies, like the USA, in the 1960s. In the 1970s, Taiwan then shifted from labour-driven to capital-oriented industries in response to rise labour and import costs, which were exacerbated by the twin oil shocks.

To some extent, it was the ‘flying geese’ pattern of industrial development by following the footstep of Japan’s industrialisation in the post-war era. Meier argued that it was a process of ‘learning by exporting’ by picking up the industrial sectors that Japan left when it moved up on the ‘ladder of comparative advantage’.

[…] Taiwan, as one of the first tier of the flying geese, faced more competition in the second stage of EP (export promotion) from the second tier followers in South East Asia and China after its economic reform and openness.

An excerpt from “Connecting Taiwan: Participation – Integration – Impacts” by Carsten Storm.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the importance of the ‘Flying Geese’ model in explaining the phenomenal growth of Taiwan from the 1970s to 1980s.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the rise of Asian Tiger economies and the Global Economy. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - Why is Myanmar's military so powerful - Approaches to Governance Notes

Why is Myanmar’s military so powerful?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Search for Political Stability
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme I Chapter 1: Approaches to Governance

Historical Context: Humble beginnings
4 January 1948 marked the newly-independent Union of Burma. Initially, the Burmese military was led by a Karen, General Smith Dun. Later, Dun was replaced by a Burma, General Ne Win. In the mid-1950s, the Tatmadaw (official name for the armed forces of Myanmar) numbered only 110,000.

While Mountbatten accepted Aung San’s recommendation of Bo Let Ya as junior Deputy Inspector General, he chose Colonel Smith Dun, a rapidly promoted officer of Karen ethnicity, as the other and slightly more senior Deputy Inspector General from the old Burma army.

[…] Ne Win was then appointed as the Deputy Defence Minister. Under the new dispensation, Smith Dun, as Chief of the General Staff, was to have direct access to the Prime Minister in case of disagreements with Ne Win, an arrangement which the BSM chief, General Bourne, founded highly unsatisfactory.

An excerpt from “General Ne Win: A Political Biography” by Robert Taylor.

The military was charged with the responsibility to maintain social and political order. As Prime Minister U Nu’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government was beset by two communist rebellions and minority revolts, the democratic leader turned to General Ne Win for help.

After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the remnant Kuomintang (KMT) forces fled into northern Burma, biding time to launch resistance movements on the mainland. U Nu was concerned that the Chinese confrontation may spill over into the northern parts of Burma.

Caretaker Government (1958-1960)
Although elections were scheduled to be held in 1958, the AFPFL was increasingly fractured due to divisive political views. U Nu’s decision to pardon leftist soldiers had alarmed the military. These soldiers supported the National United Front, which demanded to join the military.

To prevent Burma from being plunged into a civil war, U Nu made reference to the constitution, allowing the military to take over. During this two-year period, the military was tasked to restore law and order and prepare the nation for elections.

Senior military personnel approached the prime minister suggesting that he allow the military to take over for a period (initially six months that was extended to about eighteen months) to avoid internal conflict. The legislature agreed; it was characterized as a “coup by consent” or a “pseudo-constitutional-peaceful-military coup d’état ”. “U Nu took the constitutional way out and Ne Win the constitutional way in.

[…] The “caretaker” military forcibly lowered prices in the bazaars, removed over 160,000 illegal squatters from downtown Rangoon to the rice paddies of the suburbs (the military repeated this in 1988/89), diminished insurgent control, negotiated the Chinese border agreement (signed later by U Nu), eliminated the legal authority of the hereditary ethnic Shan and Kayah leaders, and passed a universal (male-female) military conscription law passed (but never enforced) on an Israeli model.

An excerpt taken from “The Military in Burma/Myanmar: On the Longevity of Tatmadaw Rule” by David I. Steinberg.

General elections were then held on 6 February 1960 after the military voluntarily handed over to a civilian government for democratic processes to persist. U Nu’s ‘Clean AFPFL’ won 158 seats, whereas Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe’s ‘Stable AFPFL’ won 41 seats. The leftist NUF won only 3 seats.

During the elections, U Nu campaigned the promotion of Buddhism as the state religion, which angered the Kachin minority. Notably, the the military was partly comprised of Kachins, which may have influenced the decision for a military-led revolt. General Ne Win objected to the pro-Buddhist policies of U Nu as the some of the military personnel were Christians.

Enter the Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962): The Coup & Pre-eminence of the Military
After the military coup on 2 March 1962, a 17-man military council formed the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). Subsequently, the BSPP imposed strict laws to curtail political freedom.

Over the next couple of years, all other political parties were banned, censorship imposed, student protests violently suppressed, the judicial system destroyed, the bureaucracy purged of senior officials, foreigners (especially Indians—those from the subcontinent—and Chinese) expelled, and a nationalization of all industry begun. Buddhist monks were finally registered, and in 1982 a highly nationalistic citizenship law was enacted. To run a socialist government requires a talented bureaucracy, but it had been decimated. Eminent Burmese economists left the country.

An excerpt taken from “The Military in Burma/Myanmar: On the Longevity of Tatmadaw Rule” by David I. Steinberg.

Overall, the military dominated nearly all aspects, the economy, politics and even the society. For instance, 15,000 businesses were nationalised, enabling the military to run the economy. The BSPP expanded its organisation, including 99,000 ‘candidate’ members and 167,000 ‘sympathisers’. The Tatmadaw formed a Central School of Political Science in 1963 and trained over 29,000 cadres. These cadres replaced the civilian elites that initially occupied civil service sectors.

In 1974, a new constitution was developed, legitimising the BSPP as the sole party.

On 3 January 1974, the Constitution was enacted. It constitutionalised a single party system with the BSPP as the sole political party. It established a unicameral legislature as the most powerful state organ. The Council of State was formed from the members of the unicameral legislature and remained responsible to it. The unicameral legislature elected all major bodies including the Council of Ministers, the Council of People’s Justices, the Council of People’s Attorneys and the Council of People’s Inspectors. Members of the Pyithu Hluttaw were in theory directly elected, and elections were to be held every four years. Elections were held in 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1985. These elections, however, usually only had one candidate for each seat.

An excerpt taken from “The Constitution of Myanmar: A Contextual Analysis” by Melissa Crouch.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that military intervention in the politics of independent Southeast Asia led to increased political stability?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Approaches to Governance. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - How did Singapore respond to the Cambodian Crisis - ASEAN Notes

How did Singapore respond to the Cambodian Crisis of 1979?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Essay Questions
Theme II Chapter 2: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991): ASEAN and the Cold War (ASEAN’s responses to Cold War bipolarity)

Prelude to the CGDK: An enervating meeting
In view of the Vietnamese invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia in the late 1970s, ASEAN and its member nations including Singapore became increasingly concerned with this challenge posed to regional security.

In 1979, the Thai Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun and the Singapore Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam met the members of the outsted Pol Pot regime, such as Kheiu Samphan and Ieng Sary. During the meeting, Thailand and Singapore deliberated on the inclusion of other Cambodian factions to oppose the pro-Vietnamese puppet regime under Heng Samrin.

Notably, this meeting had set the stage for the creation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in June 1982. Rajaratnam made it clear to the Pol Pot leaders that they had to take a backseat, while the other two groups, namely Sihanouk’s royalist faction and anti-communists under Son Sann, led the coalition. This was because of the controversial atrocities committed Pol Pot regime in the 1970s that would have hindered efforts to garner international support.

Minister Rajaratnam reminded them of the horrors [the Pol Pot regime] had perpetrated and that they had no chance of getting international support without forming a coalition with other nationalist groups. […] While this discussion was going on, I observed that Ieng Sary’s wife, Ieng Thirith, was giving fierce looks at our Minister, boiling with anger, breathing heavily with chest heaving and subsiding as she listened to her husband’s requests being rejected. [..] We prevailed because they had no choice. We thus cobbled together a coalition under Prince Sihanouk.

An excerpt from a chapter entitled “Scenes from the Cambodian Drama” by Mr. S. Dhanabalan in “The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats” by Tommy Koh and Chang Li Lin.

Interactions with China
During a special International Conference on Cambodia in 1980, ASEAN had lobbied for a United Nations resolution to demand the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. During the Conference, a delegation that represented the People’s Republic of China (PRC) asserted that the Pol Pot regime should be reinstated, which drew criticisms due to moral and pragmatic reasons.

The Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nian Long alleged that Singapore was involved in a conspiracy to influence the attendees of the Conference to oppose the return of the Pol Pot regime. In response, Dhanabalan disagreed, stating that there was an overwhelming majority that was against this move.

I was surprised to note how keen the U.S. was to accommodate the PRC’s request. I explained to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State that it was not possible to accede to the PRC’s request as it was wrong and would not get any support from the conference. He ended the meeting by threatening that he would go over my head and take the matter up with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore.

[…] PM Lee sent a note to the effect that the Foreign Minister represented the Singapore’s government’s position at the conference. It was a real life experience for me that interests and not principles determine the actions of big powers. The International Conference on Cambodia adopted a resolution that reflected ASEAN’s position.

An excerpt from a chapter entitled “Scenes from the Cambodian Drama” by Mr. S. Dhanabalan in “The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats” by Tommy Koh and Chang Li Lin.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the political effectiveness of Singapore’s efforts in response to the Third Indochina War.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Regional Conflicts and Cooperation. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the purpose of Tripoli Agreement - National Unity Notes

What is the purpose of Tripoli Agreement?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Search for Political Stability
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme I Chapter 2: Approaches to National Unity

Historical Background: Moro Muslim separatism
In May 1968, the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was formed in the wake of the ‘Corregidor Affair‘, in which the Philippine armed forces was being criticised for causing the killing of Moro Muslim soldiers for a secret operation to take over Sabah. The MIM aimed to lead political activities to create a separate Moro state in southern Philippines.

In October 1972, younger leaders of the MIM formed a splinter group known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Pulau Pangkor, Malaysia. They viewed the older Moro elites in the MIM as ineffective.

Conflagration: Martial Law of 1972
On 23 September 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, claiming that the growing violence between Christians and Muslims and the rise of an illegal separatist movement necessitated the use of authoritarian measures. In response, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were deployed to suppress the Moro Muslim rebellions.

Within two months after the declaration of martial rule, in November 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front-Bangsa Moro Army (MNLF-BMA) launched a series of coordinated attacks on military outposts and announced to the world the struggle for independence of the Bangsa Moro. It declared the entirety of Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago and Palawan as the ancestral homeland of the Bangsa Moro. Its battlecry: “Victory or to the graveyard!”

An excerpt from “The Minoritization of Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago” by Rudy Buhay Rodil.

The MNLF operated from Malaysia and received military aid from abroad, notably Libya and Malaysia. One key figure of the MNLF, Hashim Salamat, made a personal visit to Libya and convinced the government to switch support from the MIM to the MNLF. Over time, more Moro rebels joined the MNLF, leading to the expansion of the separatist movement.

In 1974, the AFP led a major military operation to defeat the MNLF separatists. On the other hand, the MNLF stood their ground, receiving help from its external supporters. For instance, military advisors from Libya helped the MNLF to utilise guerilla tactics to oppose the AFP.

The Tripoli Agreement: An illusory peace?
In July 1975, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) urged the Marcos government to reach a political settlement with the MNLF. The OIC is an inter-governmental organisation founded in 1969 to safeguard Muslim interests around the world and achieve peace and harmony.

On 23 December 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement. It created the first autonomous region in the southern Philippines, including areas like Basilan, Palawan and Sulu. The Agreement meant to grant the autonomous government to have an executive council, legislative assembly, financial system and special regional security forces.

The Tripoli Agreement also benefited Marcos. The Philippine Armed Forces also badly needed a ceasefire. By approving an agreement which at first appeared to contain substantive concessions on his part, Marcos managed to reduce Islamic Conference pressure and even neutralize the Libyans, the MNLF’s strongest supporters. Moreover, Marcos held the power to implement the agreement as he saw fit.

An excerpt from “The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance” by Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom.

When the MNLF requested Marcos to implement the Tripoli Agreement by executive order, he submitted it to a referendum within the provinces that would be part of the newly-proposed autonomous region instead. On 17 April 1977, a majority of voters objected the Agreement.

Given that the Agreement failed to create a unified autonomous region led by the MNLF, the leaders ended talks with the Marcos government and rallied its members to resume guerilla attacks and demand complete independence. Notably, MNLF leaders Hashim Salamat and Nur Misuari left the group and established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Salamat asserted that the MNLF should have pursued the goal of creating an Islamic nation.

However, on 4 January the Philippine government announced that a referendum would be held in the southern provinces to ascertain which wanted to be autonomous; other areas could have their own referenda, so diluting the Muslim character of the south. Gaddafi did not like the sound of this, and the MNLF flatly rejected the idea of a referendum. To sweeten the pill Marcos promised a conditional amnesty for Muslim rebels in the south and then promulgated new laws for a Muslim court system. The fresh talks in Tripoli collapse, the Marcos envoy returned to Manila, and the MNLF threatened to resume hostilities; by now the Moros were demanding their own flag, their own army, and the incorporation of three Christian provinces (offering offshore oil and good farmland) into the Muslim area.

An excerpt from “Libya: The Struggle for Survival ” by G L Simons and Isaline Bergamaschi.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the political reasons that explain the rise of separatism in independent Southeast Asian states.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Approaches to National Unity. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the Free Aceh Movement - National Unity Notes

What is the Free Aceh Movement?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Search for Political Stability
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme I Chapter 2: Approaches to National Unity

Historical Background
Aceh is located in the north-western tip of Sumatra. Notably, the Acehnese supported the practice of Islam. In the 1950s, Aceh rallied behind the Darul Islam rebellion, which resulted in a partial acceptance by the Sukarno government to grant a ‘special region’ status for Aceh. It was seen as an accommodative response by the government, enabling the Acehnese to manage their own matters relating to religion, education and customary law.

To put an end to the violence, Aceh was granted the status ‘Special Region of Aceh’ (Daerah Istimewa Aceh) in 1959, supposedly having autonomy in matters pertaining to Religion, Education and Customary law. However, most Acehnese claim that this ‘special status’ is a farce because on most occasions, the central government in Jakarta enforces its national laws, even when these laws completely contradict local customs. For example, in the late 1980s when the central government announced a national anti-jilbab (veil) policy – Aceh was also forced to bow down to national policy.

An excerpt from “Gender, Islam, Nationalism and the State in Aceh: The Paradox of Power, Co-optation and Resistance” by Joy Aquino Siapno.

However, problems began to surface due to growing discontent over two reasons. First, the transmigration policy involved the relocation of workers from the overpopulated Java to other islands, including Aceh. Consequently, Javanese immigrants occupied the mountains and industrial zones on the Aceh coast, cutting off Acehnese access to fish and rice for subsistence.

Second, public discontent related to the distribution of Aceh’s natural resource. Although the Aceh supplies thirty percent of Indonesian oil and natural gas by the late 1980s, it was still one of the poorest provinces in the country.

Free Aceh Movement
A former Darul Islam leader Hasan di Tiro formed the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in December 1976. The separatists aimed to create an independent Islamic state. GAM went through four key phases, the late 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s as result of military operations launched by Jakarta. Under Suharto’s New Order, the Indonesian army (Tentera Nasional Indonesia, TNI) mobilised its troops to quell the separatist insurgencies from the late 1970s to 1990s.

Tensions continued to rise, and in 1989, the civil war resumed. Attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Scandinavian-based exiled leadership were halfhearted at best. The war was bloody and very costly for GAM, with several thousand members killed. The TNI increased its presence in the province throughout the 1990s, reaching a peak of thirty thousand troops (the police were part of the army until 1999).

[…] GAM’s fourth phase began in 1999 with a renewed offensive to take advantage of the collapse of the Suharto regime/military-backed government. The system of civilian administration by the military ended, though civil administration was very weak. The military was on the defensive for human rights abuses and its role in keeping Suharto in power, so GAM seized the initiative and launched a wave of attacks. GAM truly believed that Indonesia was on the cusp of being a failed state and that independence was inevitable.

An excerpt from “Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Reconciliation” by Zachary Abuza.

Peaceful resolution and an unexpected national disaster
In December 2002, GAM and the Indonesian government signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, allowing for temporary ceasefire between the parties. Although the agreement broke down, GAM ceased hostilities after a massive earthquake in the Indian Ocean occurred on 26 December 2004, which caused a tsunami that affected numerous Acehnese. Both the GAM and government focused on providing humanitarian relief to the affected people.

In February 2005, another round of peace talks were held in Finland. Five months later, a peace deal was finally reached, ending the three decade-long insurgency.

The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) confirm their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all.

The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

The parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful settlement of the conflict will enable the rebuilding of Aceh after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to progress and succeed.

An excerpt from “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement“, 15 August 2005.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that minority responses were most important in affecting government efforts to forge national unity?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Approaches to National Unity. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the Chiang Mai Initiative - Asian Financial Crisis Notes

What is the Chiang Mai Initiative?

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Topic of Study[For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Economic Development after Independence
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 2: Asian Financial Crisis

The Asian Financial Crisis: A regional solution
In view of the disastrous impacts caused by the Asian Financial Crisis, member states of the regional organisation ASEAN gathered to discuss the possible responses to mitigate the adverse impacts.

On 6 May 2022, ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea gathered in Chiang Mai, Thailand, to discuss the creation of a network of bilateral currency swap agreements. The meeting took place as part of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Participants were described as “ASEAN+3” (APT).

But very soon, particularly in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the APT evolved into an institutionalized forum of consultation and cooperation between ASEAN and three Northeast Asian powers over a growing range of regional issues, including economic cooperation, financial and monetary cooperation, social and human resource development, scientific and technical development, culture, information, development, political and security areas, and various transnational issues.

An excerpt from “The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Explaining Regional Economic Integration in East Asia” by Kevin G. Cai.

The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
The Initiative was introduced to avert a similar disaster. The ASEAN+3 members also proposed the creation of a pool of foreign exchange reserves, which will be accessible by participating central banks to stave off currency speculation.

A most important achievement of the APT in the wake of the Asian financial crisis seemed to be the introduction of the Chiang Mai initiative (CMI) in 2000, which led to the establishment of a system of 15 bilateral currency swap arrangements among APT member states plus ASEAN swap arrangement that was designed to improve regional financial stability. Efforts were then made to multilateralize the CMI by converting bilateral swap arrangements into a common funding pool of foreign exchange reserves.

An excerpt from “The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Explaining Regional Economic Integration in East Asia” by Kevin G. Cai.

The APT conference had officiated the “Asian Currency Cooperation Plan”, which functioned on two paths. First, a currency exchange agreement was developed to allow the exchange of financial information. Second, a supervising institution was set up to prevent possible currency crises through close coordination between central banks of partner nations.

The present exchange agreement implies, in fact, that Japan works as the supplier of currency in international exchange. Japan and Korea can mutually exchange $7 billion in dollar-Korean won; Japan and Thailand signed a U.S. dollar-baht exchange agreement worth $3 billion; Japan and the Philippines reached an agreement worth $3 billion; Japan and Malaysia reached agreement to exchange $3.5 billion;

An excerpt from “Co-design for a New East Asia After the Crisis” by Hitoshi Hirakawa and Young-Ho Kim.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that Southeast Asian governments were effective in their responses to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Asian Financial Crisis. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the significance of the Geneva Accords of 1954 - Vietnam War Notes

What is the significance of the Geneva Accords of 1954?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Cold War (1945-1991)
Section A: Source-based Case Study
Theme I Chapter 2: A World Divided by the Cold War – Manifestations of the global Cold War: Vietnam War (1955-75)

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Essay Questions
Theme II Chapter 2: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991): The Second Indochina War (1964-1975)

Historical Context
From 1946 to 1954, the French colonial power fought against the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh. The United States backed the French due to fears of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, given the Communist leanings of the Vietnamese forces.

The decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu in March 1954 ended with the French defeat. As a result, the French withdrew from Vietnam.

The repercussions of Dien Bien Phu were swiftly felt around the world. Charles de Gaulle had always been adamant that the loss of Indochina would spell the end of the French empire.

[…] Nonetheless, Indochina’s nationalists achieved almost all their goals with the Geneva Accords of 21 July 1954. Cambodia and Laos had their independence recognized, while Vietnam was divided along the 17th Parallel. This created a formal ceasefire line, which accepted communist control of the north but not the south. Washington was far from happy with this latter concession. To some, it looked like Korea all over again.

An excerpt from “Dien Bien Phu (Cold War 1945–1991)” by Anthony Tucker-Jones.

The Geneva Conference
On 26 April 1954, the United States, Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China, France and Great Britain gathered in Geneva, Switzerland to discuss the future of Indochina and outstanding matters from the Korean War that ended in an armistice a year ago.

In July, the Geneva Agreement were signed. There were three key takeaway points from the Agreement:

  1. The French withdrew their forces from northern Vietnam
  2. Vietnam would be divided at the 17th Parallel temporarily
  3. Elections to be held within two years to select a president and reunify Vietnam

The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot.

An excerpt from the Geneva Agreements, 20-21 July 1954.

Ho Chi Minh signed the agreement, but not the United States. Some American officials expressed concerns that the election outcome may not be in their favour, given Ho’s popularity. As such, the US government propped up an anti-Communist government in South Vietnam.

In October 1956, the Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed by President Ngo Dinh Diem, who replaced the French-backed puppet Emperor Bao Dai.

Shortly thereafter, the [Eisenhower] administration affirmed its commitment to the containment of communist influence in Southeast Asia by signing the Manila Pact, which provided for the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Fatefully, it also began a comprehensive aid program, jointly with the French at first, to prop up the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon as a bulwark against communist expansion in Vietnam. Soon Americans were training Diem’s fledgling armed forces and becoming otherwise more directly involved in Indochina.

An excerpt from “Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965” by Pierre Asselin.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that political factors were most significant in influencing the start of the Vietnam War in the 1960s?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Vietnam War, Korean War and Cuban Missile Crisis. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the Look East policy - Economic Development Notes

What is the Look East Policy of Malaysia?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Economic Development after Independence
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 1: Paths to Economic Development

Historical context: Learning from the best
Six months after Dr. Mahathir assumed the role as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, his administration launched the ‘Look East Policy‘ in February 1982, which called upon Malaysians to emulate the Japanese work ethic and business management techniques. By doing so, the government aims to acquire Japanese expertise and capital through bilateral trade and investment.

To Mahathir, the definition of ‘East’ consisted of Japan and South Korea. Interesting, Taiwan and Singapore were not being raised as case study references.

Mahathir also mentioned two features which Malaysia proposed to adopt from the Japanese model. One was the concept of Malaysia Incorporated, intended to encourage business owners and workers in the public and private sectors to work together. Another was to create large companies based on the Japanese sogo shoshas (the large trading companies), although in Malaysia these were not developed as rapidly as the Prime Minister would have wished.

An excerpt from “Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir” by Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne.

Two-pronged approach
The ‘Look East Policy’ had two parts. First, Malaysians studied at the Japanese universities. Second, trainees worked at Japanese industries. The program was mainly financed by the Malaysian government, while the Japanese counterpart deployed Japanese trainers and covered part of the expenditure.

No one can dispute that Japan achieved a miracle when it rebuilt itself after the war. How did it do it? It did it by not being advised by other people. It did it in its own way. The only advice it accepted was to produce high quality goods, goods of world standards, so as to be accepted by the world markets. The rest was entirely Japanese.

[…] Japan has been censured for the close cooperation between the government and the corporations. Japan incorporated was regarded as some kind of cronyism involving the government and the private sector. Malaysia sees nothing wrong in the close collaboration between government and the private sector. The government should help the private sector to succeed because a large chunk of the profits made by the private sector belongs to the government. In helping the private sector the government is actually helping itself.

An excerpt from a speech by Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, on “Look East Policy – The Challenges for Japan in a Globalized World“, in 2002, marking the 20th anniversary of the ‘Look East Policy’.

Dr. Mahathir held a firm belief that the ‘Look East Policy’ was vital in realising his Vision 2020, an aim to transform Malaysia into fully developed nation by doubling the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) every decade between 1990 and 2020. Japan was identified as a integral role to fulfil this national aim.

A pipedream in the making?
However, government efforts to emulate the successful Japanese model were obstructed by several factors. One such problem was the cultural differences. For instance, the Japanese employees have adapted to long working hours, but there was resistance from the Malaysians.

Another issue was related to the differences in economic development. While Japan was a pro-Capitalist developed nation, Malaysia was still in the process of transforming from a developing nation to a newly-industrialised economy.

The application of the ‘Look East Policy’ can be traced to the establishment of the Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) in 1980, which was also key feature in Mahathir’s policymaking in the 1980s. With the help of a team of United Nations development experts, HICOM formed companies, such as the Proton Saga national car project (Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional) and the Perwaja Terengganu steel mill.

While still Minister of Trade and Industry, Mahathir contacted Mitsubishi, apparently without sounding out any other possible Japanese partners, and reached agreement with Mitsubishi.

[…] There seems to have been reluctance to make use of knowledgeable Chinese in the Proton project. However, on marketing and selling, the government relied on existing Chinese firms. There was some truth in comments that the Proton was not really a Malaysian car, but a Japanese car with a Malaysian “chop” (name). In 1994 Mahathir accepted this, admitting that Malaysia would not have the know-how to produce a fully fledged car for ten to fifteen years.

An excerpt from “Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir” by Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that external actors were more important than domestic actors in promoting economic development of Southeast Asian states?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Paths to Economic Development. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

What is the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Essay Questions
Theme II Chapter 2: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991): ASEAN and the Cold War (ASEAN’s responses to Cold War bipolarity)

Historical context: Third Indochina War
In December 1978, Vietnamese forces entered Cambodian territory and toppled the Khmer Rouge regime. Subsequently, the pro-Vietnamese People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was formed, led by Cambodian politician Heng Samrin.

An ASEAN-backed solution: Enter the Coalition
In 1980, ASEAN and China urged the Khmer Rouge and the royalists to join forces and form a coalition group to prevent the legitimisation of the PRK government. Norodom Sihanouk had set some conditions before returning to politics, such as disarmament to prevent another round of atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge as well as the deployment of peacekeepers after the Vietnamese withdrawal.

Notably, Sihanouk also requested that the country’s official name be changed from Democratic Kampuchea to Cambodia.

Leaders of the political factions Sihanouk, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan attended a summit hosted by Singapore in September 1981. Eventually, a ‘four-points’ agreement was made, which included the formation of a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).

With the CGDK being formed, the factions can garner foreign military support for the other two factions besides the Khmer Rouge, particuarly the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC).

On 22 June 1982, the three leaders signed an agreement to officiate the establishment of the CGDK in Kuala Lumpur. The June agreement stated that the CGDK’s aim was to “mobilize all efforts in the common struggle to liberate Kampuchea from the Vietnamese aggressors”.

More importantly, the three political factions in the coalition group would share power equally and make decisions through consensus.

On June 22, 1982, the three coalition leaders met in Kuala Lumpur to sign an agreement establishing a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), on the basis of four principles. Prince Norodom Sihanouk was president, with Son Sann the premier and Khieu Samphan the vice president, in charge of foreign affairs. […] and the new president launched an appeal to all friendly countries to bring aid and support for the “sacred cause”, the restoration of peace in Kampuchea and stability and security in that part of the world.

An excerpt from “Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 1979-1998” by Macalister Brown and Joseph Jermiah Zasloff.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that ASEAN played a crucial role in the resolution of the Cambodian Crisis?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Regional Conflicts and Cooperation. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - How did the 1970s oil crises affect Southeast Asia

How did the 1970s oil crises affect Southeast Asia?

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Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Economic Development after Independence
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 1: Paths to Economic Development

Historical context: The 1970s oil shocks
In the early 1970s, petrostates in the Arab world agreed to boycott Western nations, such as the USA and UK, for their provision of support to Israel during the Yom Kippur War against Egypt. As a result, crude oil prices quadrupled from $3 per barrel to $12 per barrel by 1974.

The second oil shock took place between 1978-1979, in which the Iranian Revolution concluded with the fall of the Shah’s regime. At that time, Iran was the world’s second-largest oil exporter. With the temporary halt in oil production in Iran, the political turmoil had further devastated the world oil markets, causing oil prices to surge to nearly $30 per barrel by early 1980.

A windfall in Indonesia: Surge of petrodollars
In Southeast Asia, oil exporting nations like Indonesia benefited from this unprecedented development, given their membership in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The oil price in Indonesia increased from $1.67 per barrel in 1970 to $35 in 1981.

With large inflows of revenues from oil exports, the Indonesian government used these surpluses to correct its balance of payment deficits. Furthermore, the New Order government used the oil revenues to expand the manufacturing sector, particularly through import purchases of raw materials and capital goods. More importantly, President Suharto embarked on ambitious large-scale development programs in different parts of Indonesia, including Java.

Due to the higher oil revenues, the Indonesian government was able to undertake substantial public investments and expand and improve the efficiency of the public administration sector (for instance by raising the salaries of public servants) which, in turn, contributed to economic growth.

[…] After the early 1970s first foreign aid and then oil revenues were spent on rehabilitating and expanding the long-neglected physical infrastructure (particularly in rural areas) and transport infrastructure. This rapid expansion and improvement of the physical and transport infrastructure involved roads, railways, bridges, harbours, airports and communications.

An excerpt from “Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000” by Howard Dick, Vincent J. H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad and Kian Wie Thee.

A temporary setback: For oil-importing nations in Southeast Asia
In contrast to Indonesia and Malaysia, oil-importing nations like Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines were adversely affected by the rise in oil prices. Higher oil prices meant a decline of the terms of trade as well as their balance of payment positions.

Thailand was hit harder by the second oil crisis and the subsequent world-wide recession because the country had become more dependent on external trade, and the external terms of trade were no longer favourable. […] The rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price index, which was 7 to 10 percent during the period 1977-1979, accelerated to 19.7 percent in 1980. Economic growth slowed somewhat to an annual growth rate of 7 percent in the 1970s, with the manufacturing sector growing at a higher-than-average rate of around 10 percent per annum.

An excerpt from “Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia: Essays in Honor of Professor Shinichi Ichimura” by Seiji Naya and Akira Takayama.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that governments were responsible for the economic instability in independent Southeast Asia?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Paths to Economic Development. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.