JC History Tuition Singapore - What was the reason for the Sino-Soviet split - Sino-Soviet Relations Notes 2

What was the reason for the Sino-Soviet split?

Examine the causes of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1950s and 1960s [Video by The Cold War].

An ideological split: Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’
The Sino-Soviet split was recognised by historians as one of the most significant events of the Cold War. It meant the ‘shattering of socialist solidarity‘. This ‘Split’ could be traced to the controversial speech made by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev during the 20th Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Party Congress on 24-25 February 1956.

Unlike Mao Zedong, who revered the late Stalin (who died three years earlier) as a leading advocate of Communism, Khrushchev denounced Stalinism. He criticised the personality cult, show trials and purges that terrorised the people. As such, Mao perceived Khrushchev’s scathing characterisation of Stalin’s rule as a direct attack on his ideological beliefs.

Some people consider that Stalin was wrong in everything. This is a grave misconception. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist, yet at the same time a Marxist-Leninist who committed several gross errors without realizing that they were errors. We should view Stalin from a historical standpoint, make a proper and all round analysis to see where he was right and where he was wrong and draw useful lessons therefrom. Both the things he did right and the things he did wrong were phenomena of the international communist movement and bore the imprint of the times.

An excerpt taken from a newspaper article titled ‘Stalin’s Place in History‘ in the People’s Daily editorial, 5 April 1956.

Evidently, Mao’s opposition to the Soviet leader’s denunciation of Stalin was clearly expressed in the above newspaper article published two months after the ‘Secret Speech’.

Nonetheless, Sino-Soviet cooperation still existed at this stage, given that Mao and Stalin signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February 1950. Both parties agreed to render military aid should either be attacked. In addition, the Soviet Union sent numerous scientists, students and technicians to work in China, facilitating industrialisation.

Mao’s rejection of Khrushchev’s ‘Peaceful Coexistence’
In the ‘Secret Speech’, Khrushchev also called for a ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ with the West, claiming that the Communist bloc was not ‘destined’ to clash with Capitalism through violent revolution as claimed by Stalin in his ‘Bolshoi speech‘ in February 1946.

While Khrushchev pledged to do all possible to avoid a Third World War, Mao’s camp proclaimed that war with the ‘imperialists’ was inevitable – any other view betrayed the revolution.

Throughout 1958, Mao deliberately manufactured global quarrels in a way that was explicitly designed to challenge ‘peaceful coexistence’ and to style himself the world supremo of revolutionary troublemaking. That year, the Central Committee enshrined Mao’s slogan of ‘continuous revolution’ – a term designed to distinguish Mao’s own tireless revolution from its stalled Soviet counterpart.

An excerpt taken from “Maoism: A Global History” by Julia Lovell.

In the late 1950s, Mao made clear intentions to antaognise both the Soviet Union and the United states.

In July 1958, Khrushchev made a visit to China over Mao’s disagreements over a proposed joint submarine fleet. The ‘petty’ Mao went through great lengths to ensure that his Soviet guest was uncomfortable throughout his visit. For instance, he made Khrushchev stay in a mosquito-infested guest house without air conditioning.

In August 1958, Mao renewed tensions with the West by authorising the bombardment of Jinmen, which was part of the Republic of China (ROC). This gave rise to the second Taiwan Straits Crisis. In retaliation, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles threatened to deploy nuclear weapons.

Mao had serious doubts about the Soviet Union’s diplomatic line, with its emphasis on relaxing relations with the United States in order to improve the consumer economy and raise the standard of living. […] The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 exemplified the major Sino-Soviet differences in foreign policies, and Khrushchev felt Mao’s divergence was intolerable and he was determined to show Mao who was boss.

An excerpt taken from “Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History” by Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia.

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JC History Tuition Singapore - What is the relationship between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries

What is the relationship between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries?

The Cold War lens: Consequences of the Second Indochina War
During the Vietnam War, the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 27 January 1973, which provided an official basis for the full withdrawal of the American troops from South Vietnam. As part of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, the reduced commitment of the USA in the Asia-Pacific meant that there was a corresponding decline in its military presence in Thailand and the Philippines.

However, Hanoi held deep suspicions of the US motives of manipulating ASEAN as a Cold War instrument in the region, which conflicted with ASEAN’s neutral position as declared under its 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Even after the Paris Agreement, some ASEAN member nations maintained relations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), which Hanoi interpreted as a confirmation of its suspicions.

Besides, tensions were high as Thailand turned to China for help with its looming border security threat. In February 1979, Vietnam and China clashed in a short military confrontation, which could be seen as an extension of the Sino-Soviet split.

In Hanoi’s view, ASEAN is both an offshoot and a disguise of the US-led SEATO that serve the US interests and this explained the “insincerity of ASEAN proposal of neutrality”. Thus, in Hanoi’s future relations with ASEAN the opposition aspect would be greater than the cooperation aspect. Moreover, cooperation should serve to drive a wedge among ASEAN member states, that is “to exploit contradictions among those in the opposite side”, which had become one of the guiding principles of the Vietnamese foreign policy with respect to ASEAN.

An excerpt taken from “Flying Blind: Vietnam’s Decision to Join ASEAN” by Nguyen Vu Tung.

After the fall of Saigon, Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien raised a ‘four-point position’ in July 1976, which antagonised ASEAN nations. For instance, one of the four points stated “Regional states should develop cooperation among themselves in accordance with the specific conditions of each state and in the interest of genuine independence, peace, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, thus contributing to the cause of world peace.”

At this stage, Vietnam refused to recognise ZOPFAN and join ASEAN.

Mounting Tensions: The Third Indochina War
In December 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Kampuchea, causing the outbreak of the Third Indochina War that alarmed ASEAN. On 7 January 1979, a pro-Vietnamese government known as the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was formed. As a result, ASEAN-Vietnam relations soured.

In response to this gross violation of national sovereignty, ASEAN made repeated joint statements to call for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and the recognition of self-determination. In particular, ASEAN took the lead in calling for the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) that comprised of three anti-Phnom Penh factions in June 1982.

The Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) retaliated by declaring ASEAN countries as “hostile to Vietnam” from 1979 onwards.

As far as ASEAN is concerned, Vietnam is pursuing tactics that deliberately evade and obscure the central fact of the issue: Vietnamese armed occupation of Kampuchea. ASEAN rejects that implicit bilateralization of the problem in Vietnam’s effort to define it as a Thai-Kampuchean border dispute. Moreover, ASEAN has been unwilling to see the Vietnamese military presence in Kampuchea be submerged in a diffuse general agenda on problems of peace and stability in Southeast Asia that might include such topics as US basis in the Philippines. […] Furthermore, Vietnamese initiated bilateral official contacts with ASEAN states appear to be manipulated in a manner calculated to crack ASEAN’s external solidarity by driving a political wedge between the members.

An excerpt taken from “Southeast Asia Divided: The Asean-Indochina Crisis” by Donald E. Weatherbee.

A new age: Post-Cold War transition
On 23 October 1991, the Paris Peace Agreements were signed, marking an official end of the Third Indochina War. The late 1980s marked a turning point for ASEAN-Vietnam relations. Vietnam launched its Doi Moi reform policy to undergo political and economic transformation in both domestic and international fronts. In terms of foreign policy, Vietnam sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with ASEAN member nations in spite of its past transgressions.

The period 1992-1995, spanning an interview from the collapse of the Soviet Union and normalization of relations with China through full membership in ASEAN and diplomatic recognition by the United States, was also a time of significant change in elite views of the nature of the international system, and its implications for Vietnam.

[…] The abrupt end of the Cold War and the collapse of Vietnam’s main supporter certainly qualifies as a major “external shock”, and it had been preceded by the economic shock of the 1980s which, by undermining the old ways of conceiving socialism, had cleared the way for new thinking in the external sphere.

An excerpt taken from “Changing Worlds: Vietnam’s Transition from Cold War to Globalization” by David W. P. Elliott.

In 1992, Vietnam joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). On 28 July 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN as a full member. Subsequently, Vietnam participated in the ASEAN Free Trade (AFTA), facilitating regional economic integration that made ASEAN flourish economically.


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JC History Tuition Singapore - What are Special Economic Zones of China - Economic Transformation Notes

What are Special Economic Zones of China?

Learn more about the Special Economic Zones like Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Xiamen [Video by CGTN].

Vanguards and forerunners: Introducing the SEZs
Between 18 and 22 December 1978, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held. During this session, the Chinese government began its pivotal journey in undergoing ambitious economic reforms to correct the errors of the Maoist economic system.

As part of Deng Xiaoping‘s economic reform that began in 1979, the government designated four Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Shenzhen (深圳), Zhuhai (珠海), Shantou (汕头) and Xiamen (厦门).

These SEZs were economically open areas that promoted technology transfer, foreign investment and export activities. China sought to harness its large pool of labour to produce labour-intensive goods for export. By doing so, it can accumulate foreign exchange earnings to meet the demands of its capital-starving economy.

In addition, SEZs were important in accessing foreign technology to stimulate growth. With the influx of foreign direct investment, these SEZs could then utilise foreign technology and production techniques to enhance the processes of domestic enterprises.

The designation of the above-mentioned four SEZs was intentional. Their locations were identified given their proximity to external economies, namely Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong. There were contemplations of using these SEZs to integrate with these external economies that may eventually lead to ‘political reunification’. Besides, there was limited capital investment, thus the open-door policy could not be implemented nation-wide from the outset.

Case Study: Shenzhen
Among the four SEZs, Shenzhen became the largest and most successful zone (see Table 1.1). Its success could be attributed to its unique geographic location, given that it functioned as a channel between the mainland and Hong Kong. Furthermore, Shenzhen has abundant land resources that gave it much potential for industrial development.

Source: Pioneering Economic Reform in China’s Special Economic Zones: The Promotion of Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer in Shenzhen (Weiping Wu, 1999)

Three major work conferences were held to finetune the development strategies for Shenzhen (1981, 1985 and 1990). For example, the 1990 work conference emphasised the importance of the SEZs as the core of the coastal development strategy as well as the generation of foreign exchange. At that time, the central government directly supervised policymaking and appointments for Shenzhen.

Since the 1990s, Shenzhen’s industrial growth contributed to half of the growth in Gross Domestic Product. In 1994, contribution by the industry was 43 percent compared 11.8 percent in 1979 (see Table 2.2).

Source: Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China: Experience with Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters (Directions in Development – Countries and Regions) by Douglas Zhihua Zeng.

In fact, Shenzhen has become one of the political battlefields between the reform and conservative factions in the central government. Its success or failure, at least in the early 1980s, would determine the fate of the reform. The SEZ promoters hoped to use Shenzhen not only to promote foreign investment and technology transfer, but also to learn how to adopt selected features of a market system into the socialist reform. Shenzhen, as well as other SEZs, represented in miniature the very essence of the new reforms.

An excerpt taken from “Pioneering Economic Reform in China’s Special Economic Zones: The Promotion of Foreign Investment and Technology Transfer in Shenzhen” by Weiping Wu.

In 1984, fourteen more coastal cities were designed as SEZs, such as Yantai (烟台), Tianjin (天津) and Shanghai (上海). These SEZs prioritised the promotion of foreign investment.


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