JC History Tuition Singapore - What is the relationship between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries

What is the relationship between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries?

The Cold War lens: Consequences of the Second Indochina War
During the Vietnam War, the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 27 January 1973, which provided an official basis for the full withdrawal of the American troops from South Vietnam. As part of the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, the reduced commitment of the USA in the Asia-Pacific meant that there was a corresponding decline in its military presence in Thailand and the Philippines.

However, Hanoi held deep suspicions of the US motives of manipulating ASEAN as a Cold War instrument in the region, which conflicted with ASEAN’s neutral position as declared under its 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). Even after the Paris Agreement, some ASEAN member nations maintained relations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), which Hanoi interpreted as a confirmation of its suspicions.

Besides, tensions were high as Thailand turned to China for help with its looming border security threat. In February 1979, Vietnam and China clashed in a short military confrontation, which could be seen as an extension of the Sino-Soviet split.

In Hanoi’s view, ASEAN is both an offshoot and a disguise of the US-led SEATO that serve the US interests and this explained the “insincerity of ASEAN proposal of neutrality”. Thus, in Hanoi’s future relations with ASEAN the opposition aspect would be greater than the cooperation aspect. Moreover, cooperation should serve to drive a wedge among ASEAN member states, that is “to exploit contradictions among those in the opposite side”, which had become one of the guiding principles of the Vietnamese foreign policy with respect to ASEAN.

An excerpt taken from “Flying Blind: Vietnam’s Decision to Join ASEAN” by Nguyen Vu Tung.

After the fall of Saigon, Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien raised a ‘four-point position’ in July 1976, which antagonised ASEAN nations. For instance, one of the four points stated “Regional states should develop cooperation among themselves in accordance with the specific conditions of each state and in the interest of genuine independence, peace, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, thus contributing to the cause of world peace.”

At this stage, Vietnam refused to recognise ZOPFAN and join ASEAN.

Mounting Tensions: The Third Indochina War
In December 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Kampuchea, causing the outbreak of the Third Indochina War that alarmed ASEAN. On 7 January 1979, a pro-Vietnamese government known as the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was formed. As a result, ASEAN-Vietnam relations soured.

In response to this gross violation of national sovereignty, ASEAN made repeated joint statements to call for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea and the recognition of self-determination. In particular, ASEAN took the lead in calling for the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) that comprised of three anti-Phnom Penh factions in June 1982.

The Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) retaliated by declaring ASEAN countries as “hostile to Vietnam” from 1979 onwards.

As far as ASEAN is concerned, Vietnam is pursuing tactics that deliberately evade and obscure the central fact of the issue: Vietnamese armed occupation of Kampuchea. ASEAN rejects that implicit bilateralization of the problem in Vietnam’s effort to define it as a Thai-Kampuchean border dispute. Moreover, ASEAN has been unwilling to see the Vietnamese military presence in Kampuchea be submerged in a diffuse general agenda on problems of peace and stability in Southeast Asia that might include such topics as US basis in the Philippines. […] Furthermore, Vietnamese initiated bilateral official contacts with ASEAN states appear to be manipulated in a manner calculated to crack ASEAN’s external solidarity by driving a political wedge between the members.

An excerpt taken from “Southeast Asia Divided: The Asean-Indochina Crisis” by Donald E. Weatherbee.

A new age: Post-Cold War transition
On 23 October 1991, the Paris Peace Agreements were signed, marking an official end of the Third Indochina War. The late 1980s marked a turning point for ASEAN-Vietnam relations. Vietnam launched its Doi Moi reform policy to undergo political and economic transformation in both domestic and international fronts. In terms of foreign policy, Vietnam sought to strengthen diplomatic relations with ASEAN member nations in spite of its past transgressions.

The period 1992-1995, spanning an interview from the collapse of the Soviet Union and normalization of relations with China through full membership in ASEAN and diplomatic recognition by the United States, was also a time of significant change in elite views of the nature of the international system, and its implications for Vietnam.

[…] The abrupt end of the Cold War and the collapse of Vietnam’s main supporter certainly qualifies as a major “external shock”, and it had been preceded by the economic shock of the 1980s which, by undermining the old ways of conceiving socialism, had cleared the way for new thinking in the external sphere.

An excerpt taken from “Changing Worlds: Vietnam’s Transition from Cold War to Globalization” by David W. P. Elliott.

In 1992, Vietnam joined the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). On 28 July 1995, Vietnam joined ASEAN as a full member. Subsequently, Vietnam participated in the ASEAN Free Trade (AFTA), facilitating regional economic integration that made ASEAN flourish economically.


Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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JC History Tuition Online - Sabah Dispute Revisited

Sabah Dispute: Revisited

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 1: Inter-state tensions and co-operation: Causes of inter-state tensions: territorial disputes

Historical Context
The Sabah dispute arose because of competing claims between the Philippines and Malaya.

For the Philippines, its formal claim was based upon a 1878 Lease signed between the Sultan of Sulu, Sultan Jamal Al Alam, and Baron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent of the North Borneo Company. An annual payment of 5000 dollars was to be made to the heirs of the Sultan.

For Malaya, its claim was based on the legal transfer of power from the British to the Malayan authorities, which later oversaw the creation of the Malaysian Federation that included Sabah.

In June 1962, the Philippine President Macapagal made his first official claim to Sabah to the British government. While tensions surfaced, attempts were made to address the dispute – the Manila Accord.

The Manila Accord
On 31 July 1963, the Manila Accord was formed, involving three parties: The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya. From the Macapagal’s perspective, the Accord was seen as his personal attempt to mediate the dispute involving the Tunku’s announcement to form the Federation of Malaysia. The Federation was contested by both Sukarno and Macapagal due to varying reasons.

Based on the Accord, the Philippines asserted its right to claim Sabah (formerly known as North Borneo), insisting the this matter should be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for a peaceful settlement. Yet, the British and Malaya did not agree to this proposal.

A mission for naught?
As stated in the Accord, a United Nations mission would be conducted under the auspices of the Secretary-General or his representative to ascertain if a majority of the people in North Borneo wanted to be part of the Malaysian Federation. While Secretary-General U Thant led the mission to fulfil this agreement, the Tunku announced on 29 August 1963 that the Federation of Malaysia would be formed on 16 September (later known as ‘Malaysia Day’).

Enraged by this perceived breach of faith, the Indonesian President Sukarno launched the ‘Crush Malaysia’ (Ganyang Malaysia) campaign on 25 September 1963, marking the start of the Indonesian Confrontation (Konfrontasi). Although the mission report did recognise that a majority of the people in North Borneo agreed to join the Federation, Sukarno and Macapagal rejected the findings.

A short-lived pause: End of the Konfrontasi and the birth of ASEAN
After the 30 September incident (Gestapu) that marked the end of the abortive coup by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Suharto assumed control in March 1966. Five months later, Suharto signed a peace treaty with Kuala Lumpur, ending the Confrontation.

In that same year, Malaysia and the Philippines signed a joint communique (3 June 1966) to reaffirm mutual commitment to the Manila Accord for the peaceful settlement of the Philippine claim of Sabah.

In August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed. The claimants, the Philippines and Malaysia, were founding members of the regional association. Both parties made efforts to forge cooperation, as seen by their common agreement to fight smuggling and border crossing.

Despite several high-level talks and third-party interventions, Malaysia was not recognized by the Philippines. Ambassadors were withdrawn from each other’s capitals, and diplomatic relations were suspended. […]

President Marcos recognized the new Federation of Malaysia in June 1966, and both sides agreed in a Joint Communique to “the need to sit together” for clarifying the claim and for discussing the means of a settlement. ASEAN was created the following year, but the Sabah problem did not disappear. The importance of Sabah to the Philippines was obviously more than a mere legal claim.

An excerpt taken from “Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among Asean Member States” by Hans H. Indorf.

However, bilateral relations were once again strained by a controversial incident, also known as the ‘Corregidor Affair’.

The Jabidah Massacre and the Sabah Bill
In March 1968, the Philippine authorities approved of a secret training camp on Corregidor Island. The government’s purpose was to train recruits to infiltrate Sabah and bring about a secession of Sabah from the Malaysian Federation. When these recruits refused to cooperate, they were killed by the military. A lone survivor, Jibin Arula, made known to public what had happened. It was expected of Malaysia to express outrage at this incident, viewing the operation as a gross violation of national sovereignty.

Under Oplan Merdeka, the Philippines trained a special commando unit named Jabidah that would create chaos in Sabah. The purpose of the havoc was to force the Philippine government to take full control of Sabah, otherwise, the residents therein would decide by themselves to secede from the same territory. […] According to Jibin Arula, a survivor who lived to tell the tale, there was a “mutiny in the camp in which fourteen trainees were shot dead and seventeen were missing”.

An excerpt taken from “Neighborliness: Redefining Communities at the Frontier of Dialogue in the Southern Philippines” by Fr. Erdman Beluan Pandero.

Three months after the controversial incident, diplomatic relations were suspended once more even though both parties continued to attend ASEAN-level meetings.

Marcos stood his ground as seen by the issuance of the Sabah Bill (Baseline Law) on 18 September 1968, which highlighted the claim of Sabah as part of Philippine sovereign territory. This was known as the Republic Act 5446.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that Malaysia was more responsible than the Philippines for the Sabah dispute?


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JC History Tuition Online - How did ASEAN promote economic growth in the 1970s 3

How did ASEAN promote economic growth in the 1970s?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN Growth and Development of ASEAN: Promoting regional economic cooperation

How it all began: ASEAN Declaration
On 8 August 1967, five Southeast Asian nations signed the ASEAN Declaration in Bangkok to officiate the creation of a regional association. Within the Declaration, three out of seven objectives related to economic development.

For instance, the fifth objective states that member nations were to “collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade”.

In the late 1960s, most member states of ASEAN were largely reliant on primary products. Malaysia was a key exporter of tin, natural rubber and palm oil. Thailand specialised in the production of tapioca and rice. Yet, regional economic cooperation was not at the top of the priority list, since the main export markets for the above products were outside ASEAN. This could be the result of differing stages of economic development among the ASEAN-5.

The ASEAN economies exhibit a mixture of the characteristics of the economies of the ‘North’ and the ‘South’. There is, on the one hand, the highly industrialised, affluent and small economy of Singapore, while on the other large, less affluent and rather dualistic economies of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. Then there is Malaysia which is medium-size, natural resource rich and relatively affluent; […]

Singapore, with its policy of virtually free trade, is already well-integrated with the rest of the world, while Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand – all seeking to industrialise themselves – have high tariff and other trade barriers. Malaysia’s industrialisation strategy is also based on restricted trade, but the degree of such restrictions is lower. Given this mixture of structural characteristics, policies of trade liberalisation cannot be successful without greater co-ordination of industrial strategies of the member countries.

An excerpt taken from “ASEAN Into the 1990s” by Alison Broinowski.

Oil Shocks and The Bali Summit
The first oil crisis of 1973 had adversely affected oil-importing nations, such as Thailand and the Philippines. In addition, price fluctuations in the world markets made the attainment of economic growth unsustainable. ASEAN members began to contemplate on the need for a regional market to sustain industrialisation.

As such, Indonesian ministers (such as Widjojo Nitisastro) under Suharto’s leadership invited ASEAN leaders to attend a gathering in Jakarta in November 1975. This ‘Meeting of ASEAN Economic and Planning Ministers’ set the stage for the first ASEAN Summit in Bali in February 1976.

From the economic standpoint, the Bali Summit concluded with the signing of the ASEAN Concord. In consideration of the challenges posed by external shocks, the Concord sought to address the risk of supply shortages for food and energy.

One key initiative was the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs) that required each member state to lead a joint venture with other members. The AIPs sought to address the lack of complementariness between ASEAN economies, thus facilitating economic integration. It was estimated that each project required an investment of up to US$300 million.

However, not all member states expressed enthusiasm towards the projects.

According to Widjojo Nitisastro, Indonesia had resisted all notions of trade liberalization and regional economic integration. Indonesia, he said, was more concerned with food, as well as energy, security and with the establishment of large-scale industrial projects. Widjojo believed that, if a country felt that trade liberalization was good for it, it would open up trade unilaterally anyway.

An excerpt taken from “Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-general” by Rodolfo Severino.

Musings of an ASEAN Free Trade Area
Yet, the attempts to promote regional economic cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s were arguably disappointing, given that intra-ASEAN trade levels remained low. In the case of the AIPs, only two out of five projects were implemented, namely the urea projects under Malaysia and Indonesia. The rest were eventually withdrawn.

During the 13th ASEAN Economic Ministers meeting in May 1982, the Philippine President Marcos raised the notion of a free trade regime involving ASEAN members, which was later established a decade later.

Six years have now passed since we inaugurated in Bali, Indonesia a broad and ambitious program for regional cooperation in our part of Asia, which dramatically transformed the character of our association of Southeast Asian nations and has since riveted the attention of our peoples and governments on the tasks of making regional community possible and real in our part of the world.

[…] If free trade is a goal which commends itself to the other ASEAN member-governments, then we should lose no time in so resolving that it is. Establishing a free trade regime is an enormous undertaking, requiring a great deal of preparation and lead time. If we resolve today to establish it, perhaps we should need all of the next ten years to stage it.

An excerpt taken from the “Address of President Marcos at the 13th Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers“, 20 May 1982.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that ASEAN was effective in promoting regional economic cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s.


Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - When did Myanmar join ASEAN

When did Myanmar join ASEAN?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Historical context
During the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1996, Myanmar was granted an observer status. In August 1996, Myanmar applied for full membership. On 23 July 1997, Myanmar was formally accepted as a member of the ASEAN regional organisation.

ASEAN being put to the test: Western objections
However, the admission of Myanmar into ASEAN was not welcomed by some external powers, especially those in the western parts of the world, such as the European Union (EU) members and the United States.

In preparatory negotiations for the annual ASEAN-EU Joint Co-operation Council meeting in Bangkok, scheduled for November 1997, the EU insisted that Myanmar’s attendance be downgraded to “passive presence”, a condition that was unacceptable to ASEAN. The impasse led to the postponement of the meeting and a chilling relationship between the two groupings. Throughout 1998 and 1999, Europe maintained such policies towards Myanmar because of a “lack of progress to break the [domestic] political stalemate, the harassment of pro-democracy activists and the poor human rights record in Myanmar”.

An excerpt taken from “ASEAN Enlargement Impacts and Implications” by Carolyn L. Gates and Mya Than.

As a result of Myanmar’s domestic crisis, Myanmar was prohibited from attending an ASEAN-EU Foreign Ministers Meeting (AEMM) in Berlin on 30 March 1999. Myanmar’s non-attendance resulted in the cancellation of the AEMM, reflecting a strain in EU-ASEAN relations in the late 1990s.

The genesis of Myanmar’s entry to ASEAN
When the regional association was established in August 1967, Myanmar did not identify itself with ASEAN, given its political stance as one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

There are two key factors that could possibly explain Myanmar’s interest to join the association in the post-Cold War era: Its reversal of an isolationist policy and interest in regional economic cooperation.

From the domestic standpoint, the military government had been pre-occupied with ethnic insurgencies for decades, expending substantial resources to contain unrest. By the 1990s, the government managed to sign peace treaties to (temporarily) cease intra-state violence. Hence, it could now turn its attention to regional developments, including engagement with ASEAN.

As for the international dimension, the government was cognisant of the Western criticisms towards its domestic controversies, such as the use of force against activists and opposition groups. International isolationism was akin to a tightening noose around its neck. As such, the government desired cooperation with ASEAN to end this political ostracism.

Myanmar’s critics have argued that the reasons behind Myanmar’s decision were both political and economic. Politically, it was boycotted by the Western bloc led by the United States and the EU, the country needed international recognition and this led to the decision to join ASEAN. The economic reason was that the country needed development assistance and economic cooperation with groups of countries which were sympathetic to Myanmar and ASEAN was ready to accept it as a member, since the country was facing economic sanctions imposed by the West.

An excerpt taken from “Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Co-operation Experience“. by Mya Than.

A family united?
Although there were reservations expressed by Thailand and the Philippines over Myanmar’s poor human rights record, Malaysia rallied behind Myanmar.

During a keynote address by then-Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, on 24 July 1997, he asserted that the inclusion of both Myanmar and Laos should be hailed as a great achievement in bringing the association closer to the goal of realising the ‘ASEAN-10’ vision.

ASEAN’s accomplishments are even more remarkable considering that not so long ago there were wars and conflicts in the region and within many of the ASEAN countries. It was predicted that if North Vietnam achieved victory, then, like dominoes one by one the other countries in the region would fall to Communism and chaos. We were told then, as we are told now, that we needed foreign protection against predatory neighbours such as a victorious Vietnam and the other powerful Eastern countries.

An excerpt taken from “Keynote Address By The Honourable Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamed The Prime Minister of Malaysia“, 24 July 1997.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that ASEAN’s membership expansion in the 1990s has strengthened the organisation?


Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - How did ASEAN respond to the South China Sea dispute - ASEAN Notes

How did ASEAN respond to the South China Sea dispute?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Historical context
In the 1990s, ASEAN faced a new challenge, particularly the need to maintain amicable relations with a rising Great Power in a multipolar world. While China stood on the same side as ASEAN in response to the Third Indochina War in the 1980s, the latter was once again put to the test. This time, the contention lies with the strategic body of water, known as the South China Sea.

By some estimates, the South China Sea is one of the most valuable strategic locations on the planet. It has proven oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and 900 trillion cubic metres of natural gas, and is traversed by half the world’s merchant fleet tonnage and a third of all maritime traffic. The value of trade passing through it annually is estimated at over US$3 trillion. This provides a lucrative incentive to littoral states to assert even tenuous claims, and unsurprisingly, there is fierce competition among them to carve out a piece of this prized marine real estate.

An excerpt taken from “The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Asia and the Pacific” by Simon Chesterman Hisashi Owada and Ben Saul.

Tensions on the rise: ASEAN’s diplomacy
Although member states like the Philippines had competing claims as well, China agreed to participate in meetings with ASEAN, as seen by its involvement in the China-ASEAN Senior Official Meeting (SOC) in April 1995. Notably, the meeting was held in Hangzhou after the ‘Mischief Reef’ incident two months earlier.

On 8 February 1995, the Philippines identified eight Chinese ships in vicinity of the Mischief Reef, which was about 200 kilometres from the Philippine island of Palawan. In response, the Philippine President Fidel Ramos cricitised China’s action. The dispute escalated tensions as Chinese territorial markers were destroyed and Chinese fishermen were arrested in March.

The de-escalation of the dispute started in the mid-1990s and was illustrated by a process of multilateral dialogue that began shortly after the 1995 Mischief Reef incident. […] Though China was not mentioned, the ASEAN foreign ministers expressed “their serious concern over recent developments which affect peace and stability in the South China Sea.” They also called “for the early resolution of the problems caused by the recent developments in Mischief Reef.” The statement was supported by Vietnam. On the eve of the first ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Hangzhou in April 1995, Chinese and ASEAN officials met for an informal meeting during which the latter expressed their concern about China’s aggressive action.

An excerpt taken from “Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a co-operative management regime” by Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers.

As a result of ASEAN’s call for a peaceful response to the dispute, the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen (钱其琛) declared prior to the second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in August 1995 that China was ready to hold multilateral talks. In addition, China would accept the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 as a “basis for negotiation”.

After the ARF, ASEAN openly called on all parties to adhere to the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. Additionally, the regional organisation pushed for a “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea”, which China agreed to sign in 2002. In essence, the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea‘ (DOC in short) ensured that China accepted a multilateral solution to the territorial dispute.

ASEAN and the PCA: A divided response?
Yet, the DOC did not mean much in the later stages. The Code was often flouted by claimants that included some ASEAN member states as well as China. In 2013, the Philippines lodged a case with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), signifying the first ever legal challenge to the territorial dispute.

On 12 July 2016, the PCA announced that its decision was in favour of the Philippines. The Tribunal objected to China’s claim based on the ‘Nine-Dash Line‘, asserting that there was “no legal basis” to claim “historic rights to resources”. More importantly, the Mischief Reef formed part of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf of the Philippines. As such, China had violated the Philippines’ sovereignty when it developed an artificial island on Mischief Reef.

Map depicting China’s “Nine-Dash Line” claim that the PCA rejected after its decision was made on Philippine’s challenge to the South China Sea dispute [Source: The Guardian].

As expected, China rejected the Tribunals’ findings. At the same time, China backed the position of Laos and Cambodia on this matter. A key point to note is that the Cambodian government announced that it would not support the Tribunal’s verdict, even before the PCA made its decision public. The Cambodian leader Hun Sen repeatedly stressed that the South China Sea dispute was not an issue between ASEAN and China.

Cambodia’s official statement very clearly reflected the preferences of the Chinese: “Cambodia views that this arbitration case is to settle the dispute brought by the Philippines against China, and this proceeding is not related with all of the ASEAN Member States … Therefore, Cambodia will not join in expressing any common position on the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration that will render its decision on the dispute between the Philippines and China.” With that, China successfully divided ASEAN.

An excerpt taken from “Dividing ASEAN and Conquering the South China Sea: China’s Financial Power Projection” by Daniel C. O’ Neill.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that Great Power politics were the key obstacle to ASEAN’s role in managing the South China Sea dispute.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - When was ASEAN formed and why - ASEAN Notes

Revisited: When was ASEAN formed and why?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation (SBCS)
Theme III Chapter 1: Reasons for the formation of ASEAN

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Theme II Chapter 2: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991) (Essay):
ASEAN and the Cold War (Formation of ASEAN)

Prelude to ASEAN: An invitation to promote co-operation
In December 1966, Thailand put forth a proposal, known as the Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC), to four other nations in the Southeast Asian (SEA) region. The SEAARC proposal states that countries in SEA “share a primary responsibility for ensuring the stability and maintaining the security of the area”. In particular, the proposal, which was drafted with Indonesia, specified the presence of “foreign bases” being temporary in nature, so as to protect the “national independence of Asian countries”.

Notably, this was an expected move by Thailand, given its disappointment expressed at the USA in view of the communist insurgency in Thailand that remained unaddressed even though it was part of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Along the same vein, Indonesia was a strong advocate of keeping the Great Powers out of the region, given its involvement in the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) ever since it hosted the Bandung Conference in April 1955.

Yet, the other countries opposed the proposal, citing the need to rely on foreign powers to protect their individual security interests.

Indonesia, despite undergoing a dramatic reorientation in foreign policy under Suharto, saw foreign powers targeting the region and maintained that its national security was best served by following a policy of self-reliance and nonalignment. It believed that the Southeast Asian states should follow its lead.

[…] The Filipinos felt that their security was best served by maintaining their strong bilateral defense ties with the United States, which kept major military bases there. Likewise, Singapore remained dependent on protection from Britain and was home to the largest British base in the region.

An excerpt taken from “Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia” by Shaun Narine.

Eventually, a compromised was reached, such that the Bangkok Declaration (that officiated the formation of ASEAN) states that “all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned”. There was no mention of collective defense arrangements that served the interests of Great Powers in the Declaration. The late international relations scholar Michael Leifer commented that this compromise was merely an effort by other nations to “placate Indonesia”.

A platform for reconciliation and cooperation
On a separate note, ASEAN was also formed because of the common desire of neighbouring countries in the region to forge stronger diplomatic ties with one another. As a result of Sukarno‘s hyper-nationalist policies towards Singapore and Malaysia during the Konfrontasi, General Suharto of Indonesia sought to make amends and promote regional cooperation through the newly-formed organisation.

From 1962 to 1966, disagreements and conflicts between the region’s states had hamstrung any efforts at cooperation. These disputes largely centred upon the proposed amalgamation of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah into the Federation of Malaysia. Both the Philippines and Indonesia refused to recognize the new Federation. The Philippines disputed the territorial claim of Sabah. Indonesia denounced the influence of Britain, which it viewed as ‘an imperial power imposing its will on Southeast Asia’.

As a result, Indonesia embarked on a violent four-year campaign of Konfrontasi, or confrontation, with the newly federated state of Malaysia, growing to include Singapore following its forced separation from the federation in 1965.

An excerpt taken from “ASEAN Resistance to Sovereignty Violation: Interests, Balancing and the Role of the Vanguard State” by Laura Southgate.

The negotiation: Thailand and Singapore on the creation of ASEAN
At first, Singapore was not keen to join ASEAN, citing the growing ambitions of Indonesia. Given Singapore’s position with the Malaysian Federation during the Konfrontasi, the first multi-lateral discussions about the establishment of this regional organisation did not even mention the city-state.

Thailand was instrumental in including Singapore in ASEAN. […] Thanat Khoman (1914-2016), Thailand’s foreign minister, then met with Rajaratnam in Bangkok and allayed fears, explaining that ASEAN would be a purely cultural, economic, social, and technical group devoted to regional cooperation. Khoman promised that ASEAN, as a non-aligned association, would not support or partake in military operations of any kind. Khoman convinced Rajaratnam that Singapore would not be implicated in Cold War politics after joining ASEAN.

An excerpt taken from “Southeast Asia in China: Historical Entanglements and Contemporary Engagements” by Ying-kit Chan and Chang-Yau Hoon.

On 8 August 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in Bangkok, Thailand. ASEAN was established with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (more commonly known as the ‘Bangkok Declaration’) by five founding member nations: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree with the view that ASEAN was largely a product of the Cold War?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the Mischief Reef incident - South China Sea Dispute

What is the Mischief Reef incident?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

What is the ‘Mischief Reef’?
The Mischief Reef has many names: The Philippines calls it the Panganiban Reef, whereas China describes it as 美濟礁 (Meiji Reef) and the Vietnamese labels it as Đá Vành Khăn. It is a low-tide elevation located in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Although the Mischief Reef is within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which was established as within 200 nautical miles from the country as stated by 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), China has made claims to this disputed territory.

The Mischief Reef is located within the Spratly Islands, in which China was known to have built military installations in 1994 and 1995. [Map extracted from Forbes]

The dispute
On 8 February 1995, the Philippine authorities identified eight Chinese ships in the vicinity of the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef. In April 1995, these authorities publicised the arrest of 62 Chinese fishermen in the hotly-contested area, charging them with the violation of international law. The situation deteriorated when the Philippines identified Chinese markers on the Mischief Reef and other islands.

In response, the Philippines declared its intention to built 7 lighthouses to assert Filipino claims and support international navigation. Additionally, the government internationalised the matter, hoping to garner support from its long-term ally, the USA, which was bounded by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.

The 1995 China/Philippines incident involving Mischief Reef (Meijijiao/Panganiban) may have had its origins in September 1994, when the Philippine armed forces detained some 55 fishers from the People’s Republic of China who tried to set up homes on one of the islands claimed by the Philippines. They were charged with illegal entry and illegal possession of explosives. In what may have been a tit-for-tat, China detained 35 Filipino fishers for a week in late January 1995 in the area of the Spratlys which the Philippines claimed and calls Kalayaan. Then on February 8, 1995, the Philippines accused China of breaking international law by stationing armed vessels at, and building structures on, the feature it calls Panganiban (Mischief Reef).

An excerpt taken from “Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea” by Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke and Noel A. Ludwig.

Although China ratified the UNCLOS III in 1996, she provoked the Philippines and Vietnam by using a method of measurement to calculate her territorial waters. This method was applicable only to countries that are archipelagic, yet China was not classified as such.

ASEAN Response
On 18 March 1995, ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement in view of the Mischief Reef incident, expressing concern over the regional stability in the South China Sea. Although the statement intentionally omitted any mention of China, it was clearly directed at this active claimant. As described by the former Thai diplomat Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ASEAN member nations raised the matter on the South China Sea dispute, hoping to engage China amicably.

At the first meeting of the ASEAN and Chinese senior Foreign Ministry officials, in April 1995 in Hangzhou, a forum that I had proposed the year before, the ASEAN delegations raised pointed questions about the Chinese position on the South China Sea and particularly about the developments on Mischief Reef.

[…] Nevertheless, the discussions were significant, being the first time that China dealt with the South China Sea question in a multilateral setting, as opposed to its preference for discussing it only bilaterally.

An excerpt taken from “Entering Uncharted Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea” by Pavin Chachavalpongpun.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the South China Sea dispute was effectively managed by ASEAN?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN and the South China Sea dispute. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - When did Indonesia get West Papua - Interstate Tensions Notes

When did Indonesia get West Papua?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 1: Inter-state tensions and co-operation: Causes of inter-state tensions

Historical background: The West New Guinea dispute
After the Netherlands ceded sovereignty to Indonesia on 27 December 1949, the Dutch retained control over the Western part of New Guinea (also known as ‘West Irian’). Its native inhabitants, the Papuans, have occupied the land for over 40,000 years.

More importantly, the Dutch continued to occupy West New Guinea for strategic reasons. The Netherlands can not only capitalise on the resource-rich territory, but also maintain its regional presence in Southeast Asia. In contrast, Sukarno believed that Indonesia should take control of West New Guinea to complete the decolonisation process.

According to the Netherlands, the 700,000 inhabitants of West Irian were racially and culturally unrelated to the Indonesians. Indonesia’s position was that its nationalist project had a territorial, rather than a racial, basis and was rooted in common suffering endured during the Dutch colonial occupation.

An excerpt taken from “Self-Determination in Disputed Colonial Territories” by Jamie Trinidad.
JC History Tuition Online - West New Guinea Map - Interstate Tensions Notes
Map of the West Papua under the Dutch role before 1962 [Extracted from CQ Press]

International responses
In 1954, Indonesia raised its concerns of West New Guinea in the 9th Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Then, Sukarno garnered support from the Afro-Asian nations during the Bandung Conference in April 1955.

International opinion on the matter was divided. While Indonesia had the backing of the Afro-Asian nations, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, the Netherlands was supported by Latin American nations and other key Western powers like the USA and the UK. Notably, Australia opposed Indonesia’s claim of West New Guinea, citing security concerns as the former administered the eastern part of the disputed territory.

There were, of course, no immediate direct results to be anticipated from this but it served notice on the world that the Indonesian struggle for West Irian now officially had behind it the support of virtually all the independent and semi-independent nations of Asia – including Communist China – and Africa, the populations of which comprised the vast majority of mankind.

An excerpt taken from “The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea Problem” by Robert C. Bone.

By 1960, more nations supported the aim to put an end to the West New Guinea dispute. On 27 November 1961, the UNGA failed to pass a resolution on the dispute as some member nations favoured the resumption of Dutch-Indonesian talks while others preferred an independent West New Guinea. Consequently, Sukarno was certain that a military campaign was necessary to wrestle control from the Dutch.

Operation Trikora & New York Agreement
On 19 December 1961, Sukarno ordered the Indonesian military to commence a full-scale invasion of West New Guinea. In response, the Dutch ramped up its military presence. Fortunately, the military operation ended when the both parties agreed to sign the New York Agreement on 15 August 1962. Under General Assembly Resolution 1752 (XVII), the United Nations would administer West New Guinea temporarily before the territory is handed over to Indonesia.

The stand-off between the Netherlands and its former colony resulted in a crisis in December of 1961 when Indonesian President Sukarno prepared for and threatened armed conflict. An agreement was negotiated under the supervision of the UN as a result of strong political pressure from the USA. […] The New York Agreement provided for a UN-supervised popular consultation in order to give the Papuans the freedom of choice in determining their future.

An excerpt taken from “Peacebuilding and International Administration: The Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo” by Niels van Willigen.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that the Indonesian Confrontation broke out due to ideological differences.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Inter-state Tensions. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the United Nations Malaysia Mission - Interstate Tensions Notes

Revisited: What is the United Nations Malaysia Mission?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 1: Inter-state tensions and co-operation: Causes of inter-state tensions

Historical background: The Conflagaration in Malaysia
When the Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed the concept of a Malaysia Federation in May 1961, there was no outright objection by the neighbouring countries, including Indonesia. However, Indonesian sentiments changed in January 1963, whereby the Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio declared a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) towards Malaysia. Indonesian troops engaged in cross-border raids and anti-Malaysia propaganda was spread to oppose the formation.

The Manila Accord: A truce?
Even so, the parties involved were not completely opposed to make amends through diplomacy. From 7-11 June 1963, the Philippine President Macapagal hosted a meeting in Manila for Indonesian President Sukarno and the Tunku.

During the meeting, the leaders signed the Manila Accord, which expressed their mutual desires to consider the wishes of the people in North Borneo (Sabah) and Sarawak when deciding on the formation of the Malaysian Federation. In particular, the results of a referendum would be taken into account based on the context of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle 9 of the Annex that advocates the principle of self-determination.

(b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory’s peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes haying been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes.

An excerpt taken from the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), Principle 9 of the Annex.

The United Nations Malaysia Mission
Following the signing of the Manila Accord, the United Nations Malaysia Mission led by Secretary-General U Thant was formed in August 1963 to ascertain the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarah prior to the creation of the Malaysian Federation. The Tunku agreed a referendum would be held before the Federation was formed, whereas Sukarno would not oppose the Federation if the majority supported it.

However, the Tunku’s decision to sign the London Agreement on 9 July 1963 was deemed problematic by Sukarno. The Agreement stated that the Malaysian Federation would be formed on 31 August 1963. Chronologically, the United Nations Malaysia Mission Report was only published on 14 September 1963, suggesting that the Tunku’s move may have been premature and a violation of the Manila Accord.

But even before anything had been done, before anything had been ascertained, before the U.N. mission’s inquiry had been completed, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putera already insisted that on 16 September Malaysia should be formed.

Why should he make decisions even while the U.N. team’s work was still not completed?

[…] Likewise, I am not pleased by the manner in which the people’s desires were assessed. In Manila, I said that the survey should be conducted in a manner in accordance with article 1541 of the U.N. [Charter], that the survey should be a truly democratic one.

An excerpt taken from Sukarno’s speech at an anti-Malaysia mass rally in Yogyakarta, 25 September 1963.

Notably, the United Nations Malaysia Mission Report concluded that “there is no doubt about the wishes of a sizeable majority of the peoples of these territories to join in the Federation of Malaysia”. Even so, U Thant expressed dismay at the Tunku’s decision to set an official date for the formation of Malaysia even before the report was concluded.

I later informed the Governments concerned that I would endeavour to report my conclusions to them by 14 September. During the course of the inquiry, the date of 16 September 1963 was announced by the Government of the Federation of Malaya with the concurrence of the British Government, the Singapore Government and the Governments of Sabah and Sarawak, for the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. This has led to misunderstanding, confusion, and even resentment among other parties to the Manila agreement, which could have been avoided if the date could have been fixed after my conclusions had been reached and made known.

An excerpt taken from the United Nations Malaysia Report titled “Final Conclusions of the Secretary-General“, 14 September 1963.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the Konfrontasi occurred mainly as a result of political disagreements?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Inter-state Tensions. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea - ASEAN Notes

What is the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Historical context: Contestation of maritime boundaries and islets
The South China Sea dispute involves the contestation of islets and maritime boundaries by different countries, both ASEAN and non-ASEAN related. In the early 1990s, claimants in the ASEAN-6 had to deal with external powers, namely Vietnam (until it joined ASEAN in 1995) and China. Within the South China Sea lies one of the most hotly contested Spratly Islands, which are claimed by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei.

Given that the Cold War came to an end by the late 1980s, the American disengagement had left behind a power vacuum in Southeast Asia, giving China the opportunity to fill the void up. To ally concerns among member nations, ASEAN made collective efforts to engage external powers amicably, as seen by its establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994.

In this article, we will take a closer look at the ASEAN Declaration of 1992.

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of 1992
During the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1992, the regional organisation formed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea as a tangible response to manage inter-state tensions in South China Sea.

Also known as the ‘Manila Declaration‘, it urged claimants to exercise self-restraint and consider joint cooperation amicably. The Declaration was built on the foundation of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976, which advocated principles of non-aggression.

1. EMPHASIZE the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force;

2. URGE all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes;

[…] 4. COMMEND all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea;

An excerpt taken from the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, 22 July 1992.

All bark and no bite?
However, not all external powers were supportive of the ASEAN Declaration. Similar to the USA, China was initially supportive of the Declaration. Yet, it was responsible for the ‘Mischief Reef‘ incident in February 1995. The Philippines discovered Chinese military installations being built at the Reef, antagonising other claimants. In retaliation, the Philippines arrested Chinese fishermen and destroyed Chinese territorial markers in following month.

Despite having expressed support for the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea during the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1992, Beijing built structures on the Mischief Reef, which was also claimed by the Philippines, in 1994. Soon after the Mischief Reef episode in early 1995, Filipino and Chinese representatives met in August in an attempt to resolve their differences. A Joint Statement on PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation was subsequently signed on 10 August 1995. Despites this, in January 1999, the Chinese were again constructing structures on another part of Mischief Reef.

An excerpt taken from “The South China Sea Dispute Revisited” by Ang Cheng Guan.

Notably, the USA took a rather hands-off approach in response to the South China Sea dispute in spite of its expressed interest to support the ASEAN Declaration. Even after the Mischief Reef incident, the USA insisted that the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty did not apply to the disputed occupation of the Mischief Reef, leaving its former Cold War ally disappointed.

ASEAN recognized the intrusion as a test of its 1992 Declaration and, acting with unprecedented cohesion, called “specifically” for the “early resolution of the problems caused by recent developments in Mischief Reef”. ASEAN’s remarkable success in forcing Chinese officials to discuss the South China Sea — despite their insistence that it should be dealt with bilaterally and not between China and ASEAN as a group — left the Americans largely unmoved.

[…] Washington made it clear that the provisions of their 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty did not apply, leaving a disappointed Philippines, which lacked a credible defence force, to fend for itself. The failure of U.S. surveillance satellites and sea or air patrols to detect six months or more of Chinese construction on Mischief Reef aggravated bilateral relations.

An excerpt taken from “Entering Unchartered Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea” by Pavin Chachavalpongpun.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that ASEAN was successful in maintaining regional security in the post-Cold War period?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about ASEAN. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.