JC History Tuition Online - What did the UN do to help Somalia - UN Notes 2

What did the UN do to help Somalia?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Historical Context: The rise and fall of Siad Barre
After a ten-year transition period under a United Nations (UN) Trusteeship in the 1950s, Somalia gained independence. From 1960 to 1969, Somalia was led by multi-party system. In 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre became President after a bloodless coup.

Under the Cold War context, Somalia had received Soviet military and financial aid. Yet, the Soviet Union disapproved Barre’s decision to launch an invasion of Ethiopia in July 1977, which was known as the Ogaden War. The war concluded with Somali defeat in March 1978 as well as the termination of Soviet aid.

The Ogaden War had a profound effect on international relations in the Horn of Africa. Russia and Cuba withdrew from the long-standing military and naval bases they had helped build in Somalia, and relocated to what was then the Red Sea coastline of Ethiopia (now Eritrea). As a result, Siad Barre switched allegiance to the West, making his first visit to the USA in 1982 […].

An excerpt taken from “Somaliland: with Addis Ababa & Eastern Ethiopia” by Philip Briggs.

In addition, the Barre government had to contend with clan-based rebellions that lasted throughout the 1980s. By then, more Somalis became disillusioned with a military dictatorship under Barre. The rebellions began with a failed coup attempt in April 1978, which were carried out by disgruntled army officers led by Colonel Mohamed Osman Irro.

By late 1990, the United Somali Congress (USC) launched an offensive on the capital Mogadishu, thus forcing Barre to flee in January 1991.

Enter the United Nations: UNOSOM
After Barre’s self-imposed exile, a civil war broke out between two factions: one that backed the Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and another that supported General Mohamed Farah Aidid. In hopes of brokering peace between the factions, the Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar dispatched a UN envoy, James Jonah.

More importantly, many Somali civilians’ lives were undermined by the civil war, thus necessitating humanitarian intervention. By November 1991, about 300,000 people died. Many suffered from malnutrition and other related diseases. Also, a million Somalis fled their homes, giving rise to a refugee crisis.

On 3 March 1992, leaders of both competing factions (Mahdi and Aidid) signed a ceasefire agreement (“Agreement on the Implementation of a Ceasefire”), which granted consent for the UN to deploy military observers to oversee the process.

On 24 April 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 751, which authorised the deployment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). UNOSOM was tasked to distribute food supplies to the Somali civilians with the help of other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). However, its relief efforts were hampered by the absence of security, which gave rise to looting by armed gangs.

However, humanitarian aid was preyed upon by a mixture of the warring factions and unaffiliated bandits. The militia leaders used food to pay their fighters and buy weapons that allowed them to extend their control and subsequently their access to wealth. […] Khalil Dale, a British Red Cross worker, recalled:

I’ve been to Afghanistan, two or three times. I’ve been to Sudan, I’ve been to a lot of war zones and famine camps and cholera camps. But I’ve never seen anything like Somalia was at that time. And it was certainly the most frightening place for me, it was the most insecure, unpredictable. You just didn’t know what was going to happen next.

An excerpt taken from “Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations” by Thijs Brocades Zaalberg.

General Aidid held dominant control of strategic locations where most of the food aid had arrived from abroad, namely the port and airfield. The problem was so serious that the ICRC had to employ nearly 20,000 armed guards to protect their personnel from looters.

Help is on the way: United Task Force
Frustrated by the lack of progress, the Bush administration supported the UNSC’s resolution to authorise an American-led force to establish a “secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia”. On 9 December 1992, Operation Restore Hope was conducted by the US government under the United Task Force (UNITAF).

Out of the 38,000 troops deployed, 24,000 were American, reflecting the commitment of the US government to support the UN’s humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Between December 1992 and May 1993, the UNITAF secured nine humanitarian relief sectors, thus enabling the resumption of humanitarian aid to the Somali civilians.

Providing security relief operations was obviously a success. By late December and early January there was consensus worldwide that the US-led intervention enabled the relief organization to deliver much-needed supplies much more effectively. As a result, many thousands of lives were saved. […]

According to the official US Army After Action Report of the Somalia mission, the Bush administration recognized that lasting peace in Somalia could only be achieved by disarming the warlords, reconciliation and assisting in the restoration of law and order and societal infrastructure.

An excerpt taken from “Soldiers and Civil Power: Supporting or Substituting Civil Authorities in Modern Peace Operations” by Thijs Brocades Zaalberg.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the failures of the United Nations mission in Somalia were expected?


Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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JC History Tuition Online - What was the Brahimi Report - UN Notes

What was the Brahimi Report?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 3: UN Reforms

Historical Context: The Report
Following the disasters in Bosnia and Rwanda, the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. He tasked the Panel to review the challenges faced by ongoing peace operations and make specific recommendations. The Panel was chaired by the UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi.

On 21 August 2000, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (also known as the “Brahimi Report” in short) was published, offering a comprehensive assessment of peacekeeping operations as well as specific recommendations to finetune the processes.

The recommendations focus, to a large degree, on structural and management problems, but the Panel also commented on the doctrine on which peace operations should be conducted. Although the Panel states that the ‘consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping’ (Brahimi Report, para. 48), the Report calls for more robust mandates that are also clear, credible and achievable, and does not only question, but also modifies, the traditional approach to peacekeeping concerning the consent of the parties, the principle of impartiality and the non-use of force.

An excerpt taken from “International Peacekeeping” by Boris Kondoch.

Let’s take a look at some of the points raised in the Report:

1. The need for clear, credible and achievable UN mandates
The Brahimi Report advised the UN Secretariat to highlight the key requirements for peace operations in dangerous environments. Also, the Secretariat should inform the UN Security Council (UNSC) when a possible operation goes beyond its capacity. By doing so, the UNSC can hold consultations with troop contributing member states when making risk assessments before deployment.

2. Requirements for effective peacebuilding
The Panel recognised the essential role that peacekeepers play in the post-conflict phase. It urged the UN to ensure that there is adequate budget allocated for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Delays in funding may risk the resurgence of violence in mission areas.

3. Enhancements to the recruitment and deployment of troops
While the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) was already established in the early 1990s under the former Secretary-General’s “An Agenda for Peace” report, the Brahimi Report made recommendations to improve on it.

In particular, the Panel requested the re-organisation of the UNSAS, with the inclusion of four levels of commitment, a new “Rapid Deployment Level” for troop resources available within 30 or 90 days of a Security Council mandate. In addition, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) will create a “Military On-Call List”. This List will facilitate timely deployment of military headquarter staffs of new missions.

Given that prevention is better than cure, one possible option for the UN would be to engage in the kind of preventive deployment that appeared to have worked in Macedonia. Deployment of peacekeepers in ‘unstable areas’ would appear to provide the possibility of helping to provide an environment in which problems could be nipped in the bud, or at least controlled. […]

However, the option of preventive diplomacy faces several problems. […] Such political will seems to have been lacking in some instances and at best the UN Security Council has been reactive to events rather than taking a more pro-active stance. Secretary-General Annan has highlighted the root causes of conflict arising out of the Brahmi Report, but it requires political action to support his efforts to address such problems. Moreover, states may be offended by being named as sites for potential armed conflict; particularly intense conflict and recourse to this option would raise serious sovereignty issues.

An excerpt taken from “United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era” by John Terence O’Neill and Nick Rees.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that the Brahimi Report showcased the relevance of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security.


Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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JC History Tuition Online - What happened in South West Africa - UN Notes

What happened in South West Africa?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: International Court of Justice: ensuring adherence to international law; arbitration and advisory opinion

Historical Background: Mandate Territory and Trust Territory
After the end of World War One, the German colony South West Africa was declared a League of Nations (LON) Mandate Territory. Under the Treaty of Versailles, South West Africa was considered a British protectorate with the Union of South Africa handling its administration. When World War Two came to an end, the LON Mandates were moved to the United Nations (UN) Trusteeship system, thus South West Africa was expected to become a UN Trust Territory.

However, the South African government opposed the process of South West Africa becoming a UN Trust Territory. Its Prime Minister Field Marshal Jan Christian Smuts supported policies of racial segregation in South Africa, sparking controversy among member nations in the UN General Assembly (UNGA).

First key response by the Court
On 11 July 1950, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave its Advisory Opinion at the request of the UNGA. With regards to the legal status of the territory in South West Africa, the ICJ asserted that the UN was “legally qualified to discharge the supervisory functions formerly exercised by the League of Nations”. Also, South Africa “had no competence to modify the international status of South West Africa unilaterally”.

If the reason for the South African government’s refusal to cooperate or negotiate with the United Nations about the status and administration of South West Africa was the fear that its racial policy would be discussed in the world forum, its tactics were a complete failure. On December 6, 1955, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which emphasized racial policy in the territory as the chief issue. It reminded the Union government “of the faith it had re-affirmed in signing the Charter, in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person,” and called on it to observe Article 56 of the Charter.

An excerpt taken from “South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid” by Amry Vandenbosch.

Even so, South Africa did not relent with its repressive policies towards South West Africa. With mounting pressure from the member states in the Sub-Saharan region in the UNGA, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed resolutions in 1969 and 1970, denouncing South Africa’s occupation of South West Africa.

On 12 June 1968, under UNGA Resolution 2372 (XXII), South West Africa was renamed as Namibia.

The second key response by the Court
On 29 July 1970, the UNSC requested the ICJ to give an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa Namibia. On 21 June 1971, the Court declared that South Africa’s presence in Namibia was illegal, thus the former should withdraw its administration. At the same time, the Court stated that all member states of the UN had to recognise the “illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia”.

In the Namibia Opinion, the ICJ drew another set of limits, this time in the context of treaty law, to the responses that states may legitimately adopt, even where this concerned an obligation erga omnes (towards all), the breach of which was invoked by, and the reaction to the breach authorized by, collective bodies. The ICJ held that the obligations of states flowing from a Security Council resolution (in this case, Resolution 276 (1970)) not to enter into treaty relations with South Africa could not “be applied to certain general conventions such as those of a humanitarian character, the non-performance of which may adversely affect the people of Namibia”, a holding reminiscent of Article 60(5) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.

An excerpt taken from “The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role After Fifty Years” by J. M. Thurnszky Sam Muller and A. S. Muller.

This time, the UNSC passed Resolution 418, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa to put sufficient pressure on the latter to comply with the Court’s Opinion. On 22 December 1988, the Tripartite Accord was signed by Angola, Cuba and South Africa, granting independence to Namibia from South Africa.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that the International Court of Justice was effective in managing the legal dispute over South West Africa.


Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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JC History Tuition Online - How did the UN respond to the Suez Canal crisis - UN Notes

How did the UN respond to the Suez Canal crisis?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Historical Context: Trouble in Suez
In October 1956, Egypt, Jordan and Syria formed a joint military command that alarmed Israel. When the USA and UK backed down on their decision to finance the development of an Aswan dam project for Egypt, President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, declaring that the transit fees would be used to pay for the infrastructure.

In retaliation, Britain and France orchestrated an attack on Egypt to reclaim the Suez. In the process, Israel was brought into the picture. On 29 October 1956, Israel invaded Sinai. On 5 November, the British and French deployed paratroopers along the Suez Canal. From October 1956 to March 1957, the Suez Canal was closed as a result of the crisis.

The [Suez] canal had been built during the 1860s under French management in partnership with Egypt. The canal itself was Egyptian, guaranteed as an open waterway under an international treaty, the Convention of Constantinople, signed in 1888. But the canal was operated by an unusual private firm, the Universal Suez Canal Company, headquartered in Paris. The British had bought a large minority of the stock from a bankrupt Egyptian government in 1875. The company had a concession to operate the canal until 1968. Surrounding the canal, loaded with infrastructure such as railroads, harbors, and warehouses, was the Canal Zone – an elaborate British base operated under an Anglo-Egyptian treaty signed in 1936.

An excerpt taken from “Suez Deconstructed: An Interactive Study in Crisis, War, and Peacemaking” by Philip Zelikow and Ernest May.

The First United Nations Emergency Force: UNEF I
On 7 November 1956, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 1001, leading to the creation of a peacekeeping force, known as the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). UNEF I was tasked to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of foreign troops (France, Britain and Israel) from Egyptian territory. Also, the UNEF I functioned as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces, monitoring a ceasefire agreement that lasted for ten years.

Through the efforts of Canada’s Minister for External Affairs Lester Pearson and various European delegates, on February 2 the General Assembly passed two resolutions that focused on both Egypt and Israel. The first deplored Israeli noncompliance with the earlier General Assembly resolution that had mandated a complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory and called upon Israel to complete its pullback without delay. The second resolution called upon both countries to observe the armistice agreement and, after Israeli troops withdrew, mandated the stationing of UNEF troops on the Israeli-Egyptian border.

An excerpt taken from “The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis” by Diane B. Kunz.

With the help of the charismatic Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, Nasser agreed to the presence of UNEF I on the condition that Egypt could revoke its agreement at any time. Furthermore, the peacekeeping troops stationed in Egypt have no authority over the people. On the other hand, Israel refused to give UNEF consent to enter its territory.

By February 1957, UNEF I had 6073 personnel, which were contributed by eleven member states of the United Nations (Yugoslavia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Brazil, Colombia, Denmark and Norway).

Six-Day War: A political bystander?
However, Egypt no longer welcomed UNEF’s presence by 1967. Given Israel’s participation in the invasion of Egypt during the Suez Canal Crisis as well as its hostility following the Palestinian War of 1948, tensions were high.

In May 1967, the Soviet Union delivered reports to Egypt, claiming that Israeli troops were amassing on the Syrian border. In anticipation of a possible military incursion, Nasser withdrew consent, forcing Secretary-General U Thant to comply with the expulsion of UNEF stationed in the Sinai Peninsula.

On 13 May 1967, [Nasser] received a Soviet intelligence report claiming that Israel was massing troops on Syria’s border. Nasser responded by taking three successive steps that made war virtually inevitable: he deployed his troops in the Sinai close to Israel’s border, he expelled the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Sinai, and, on 22 May, he closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. In Israeli eyes, this was a casus belli, a cause for war. On 5 June, Israel seized the initiative and launched the short, sharp war that ended in a resounding military defeat for Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

An excerpt taken from “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences” by Avi Shlaim and William Roger Louis.

Egypt then declared its intention to impose a blockade through the Straits of Tiran, which would have hampered Israel’s access to the Red Sea. Israel was outraged by this announcement, declaring the blockade as an act of war. On 5 June 1967, Israel commenced Operation Focus, which was a series of pre-emptive air strikes that disabled Egyptian air operations. This marked the start of the Six-Day War.

Evidently, the UN peacekeepers were helpless to the situation in spite of their initial success in response to the Suez Crisis.

An illustration on the changes to Israeli-controlled territories before and after the Six Day War of 1967. [Source: BBC]

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the key factor that determined the successes of United Nations peacekeeping was the cooperation of member states?


Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - How did decolonisation affect the United Nations - UN Notes

How did decolonisation affect the United Nations?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Historical context
On 14 December 1960, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”. In essence, the Declaration advocated the right to self-determination, thereby bringing an end to colonial rule.

Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations, […]

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

An excerpt taken from the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 947th plenary meeting, 14 December 1960.

A commitment to decolonisation: C-24
To oversee the decolonisation process, a Special Committee was established in 1961 in accordance to the General Assembly resolution 1654 (XVI). The Committee of Twenty-four, also known as C-24, carries out activities, such as examining the political and economic developments of non-self-governing territories (NSGTs).


Infographic on the Special Committee on Decolonization. [Source: United Nations]

By resolution 1603 (XV) of 20 April 1961, a Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola was created. Angola was both a colonial issue involving a commencement case, as well as a complex political situation characterized by armed conflict. In 1962 this Sub-Committee was absorbed by what was becoming the main U.N. instrumentality for decolonization, namely the Special Committee of Twenty-Four.

With a view to centralizing the U.N. action in the area of decolonization, and to concentrate it in the hands of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four, the pattern of absorption was repeated with regard to the Committee on South West Africa which was dissolved in 1961.

An excerpt taken from “The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role of Afro-Asia” byy Yassin El-Ayouty.

Branching out to security matters
In the early 1960s, the newly-formed C-24 tried to garner support from the United Nations Security Council. It called on the Council to address the issue in South West Africa, citing security concerns. Likewise, a similar matter was raised in Southern Rhodesia two years later. In 1965, the Committee expressed concerns in the Aden territory, labelling it as a ‘dangerous situation’.

Yet, the Security Council’s responses were not identical. For instance, the Council recognised the threats in South West Africa, but not so in Aden.

It is doubtful if in practice the Committee of Twenty-four had much influence on the policies which the colonial powers pursued in the territories for which they were responsible. Its pronouncements were for them an extremely marginal factor among all the considerations which had to be taken into account (including often a nationalistic home opinion holding diametrically opposite views). They were a factor which, if considered at all, were more important in the eyes of their foreign offices than of their colonial departments which had the main responsibility for policy concerning their colonial territories.

An excerpt taken from “A History of the United Nations: Volume 2: The Age of Decolonization, 1955–1965” by Evan Luard.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that decolonisation created problems for the United Nations General Assembly?


Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the peacekeeping role of the United Nations

What is the peacekeeping role of the United Nations?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war: The United Nations
On 24 October 1945, an inter-governmental organisation known as the United Nations was established. Barely a month ago, the Second World War came to an end, giving many a stark reminder of the devastation and atrocities that warmongers can cause on others.

Five decades later, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) was set up, streamlining processes to carry out peacekeeping missions to achieve myriad goals set and authorised by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Defining peacekeeping: Origins
The first peacekeeping mission took place in 1948 when the UNSC authorised the deployment of military observers to the Middle East. In particular, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) was established in May 1948 to monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements and prevent conflicts from threatening the security of Middle Eastern nations.

In its first manifestations in the United Nations, and indeed earlier, in the inter-war years, peacekeeping was strictly an inter-state activity. It had to do with the management of stressed or fractured relations between sovereign states in the international system. The United Nations Emergency Force sent to Suez in 1956 (which is often misleadingly described as the first peacekeeping operation) was interposed between Egypt and the states that had attacked it (Britain, France and Israel) following its nationalization of the Suez Canal. After Suez the essential principles of peacekeeping employed there were seen to apply as well to previous UN undertakings that had not, at the time they were established, been given the name peacekeeping.

An excerpt taken from “Peacekeeping and the International System” by Norrie MacQueen.

Notably, peacekeeping became a more ‘organised’ activity for the United Nations in 1956 when its principles were defined by then United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canadian minister Lester B. Pearson. Its principles were put to the test when the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed in response to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956.

Ever since 1948, more than 70 peacekeeping missions have been undertaken by the United Nations, involving more than 120 countries that contributed hundreds of thousands of personnel. Notably, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) was first large-scale mission that numbered 20,000 of military personnel.

Evolution of peacekeeping
In the post-Cold War phase, the role of United Nations peacekeepers was re-defined to keep the organisation relevant. Initially, the ‘blue helmets’ took on a ‘traditional’ role, which included tasks like monitoring ceasefires. In view of the rise of new challenges posed by intra-state conflicts, peacekeepers took up new responsibilities, like providing humanitarian assistance, monitoring human rights, as well as disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants.

As Secretary-General Kofi Annan memorably described the new UN role in 1998: “Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or – when neither of those things is possible – at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading.” He was reflecting the activism of the Security Council, which between 1987 and 1994 had quadrupled the number of resolutions it issued, tripled the peacekeeping operations it authorized, and multiplied by seven the number of economic sanctions it imposed per year. Military forces deployed in peacekeeping operations increased from fewer than 10,000 to more than 70,000.

An excerpt taken from “Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations” by Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that United Nations peacekeeping was successful ever since its inception.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - Who is U Thant - United Nations Notes

Who is U Thant?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Background
U Thant (သန့်) was appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations on 30 November 1961. It was six weeks after the distinguished Dag Hammarskjöld died in an air crash. U Thant was the first non-European Secretary-General. He served for two terms that eventually ended on 31 December 1971.

U Thant led diplomatic efforts in the different missions, such as the ongoing Congo Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa, the protracted Arab-Israeli War in the Middle East and the Vietnam War in Indochina.

U Thant’s Diplomacy
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, U Thant helped to pass messages between American and Soviet leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev, averting a nuclear confrontation. U Thant also visited the Cuban leader Fidel Castro to oversee the smooth removal of missiles.

U Thant called for urgent negotiations, informing the Security Council that he had sent identical messages to Kennedy and Khrushchev appealing for a two- to three-week moratorium. […] U Thant received lavish praise inside and outside the Security Council for his part in helping defuse the crisis. In the Security Council on 25 October, Ambassador Quaison-Sackey expressed appreciation to U Thant for his “tremendous show of statesmanship and initiative.”

An excerpt taken from “Preventive Diplomacy at the UN” by Bertrand G. Ramcharan.

However, U Thant’s efforts were hindered by the United States. During the Vietnam War, he tried to mediate by arranging peace talks between Washington and Hanoi, but the Johnson administration rejected his proposals. The US Secretary of State Dean Rusk objected to U Thant’s ceasefire and peace talks in Rangoon. Rusk alleged that U Thant’s enthusiasm in facilitating peace talks was influenced by his desire to claim the Nobel Peace Prize.

The third UN Secretary-General, U Thant, made a spirited attempt to find a means of ending the disastrous Vietnam War. He evolved a plan for a cease-fire in place and for a meeting of all the parties in Rangoon, where all the diplomatic representation, to agree on how to negotiate a final end to the war.

[…] Nothing more was heard from Washington, and there is no written record of what Stevenson did about it, although it now seems likely that Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who distrusted U Thant’s efforts on Vietna, may have blocked it.

An excerpt taken from “Adlai Stevenson’s Lasting Legacy” by A. Liebling.

According to Sir Brian Urquhart, there was a stark contrast between the personality of U Thant and his predecessor Hammarskjöld. U Thant was viewed as a “simple and direct” individual who spoke few words, whereas Hammarskjöld was much more articulate.

[U Thant] was friendly, informal, and genuinely interested in what one had to say – in contrast to Hammarskjöld, who paid little heed to subordinates. U Thant also differed from his predecessor in more fundamental ways.

He was simple and direct where Hammarskjöld was complicated and nuanced; a man of few words where Hammarskjöld was immensely articulate; a devout traditional Buddhist where Hammarskjöld was increasingly inclined to a personal brand of mysticism; a man of imperturbable calm where Hammarskjöld could be highly emotional; a modest and unpretentious middlebrow where Hammarskjöld was intensely intellectual; a taker of advice where Hammarskjöld almost invariably stuck to his own opinion.

An excerpt taken from “Character Sketches: U Thant” by Brian Urquhart.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that U Thant was effective in performing his duties as the United Nations Secretary-General in the 1960s?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - How did the UN support decolonisation - United Nations Notes

How did the UN support decolonisation?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Historical context
After World War Two, Third World colonies in the Africa and Asia went through decolonisation. However, not all member states of the United Nations were supportive of decolonisation, particularly those that were former colonial powers. In the early 1950s, Indonesia raised its concerns over West Irian, which was still controlled by the Netherlands.

On August 17, 1954, a day chosen with appropriate concern for nationalist symbolism, the Indonesian representative to the United Nations requested the UN Secretary-General to place the West Irian question on the agenda of that year’s regular session of the General Assembly. […] When debate was begun on the issue, Indonesia came forth with ringing declarations of the case against colonial rule.

An excerpt taken from “The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia” by Herbert Feith.

Furthermore, the Cold War rivalry has hindered efforts at international cooperation. Although the USA has always been a strong advocate of decolonisation, its British ally convinced it not to express support for this process in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

Resolution 1514
During the fifteenth session of the UNGA, member states were called upon to vote for the independence of countries and end of colonial rule. Notably, the USA abstained, whereas the Soviet Union supported the draft resolution. In total, 89 voted for the resolution, whereas 9 abstained.

As a result, UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV) was passed, which was known as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

[…] 5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

An excerpt taken from General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– In view of Third World decolonisation, assess the challenges to the political effectiveness of the United Nations General Assembly.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the Uniting for peace resolution - United Nations Notes

What is the Uniting for Peace resolution?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Historical context: The Acheson Plan
After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was able to capitalise on the Soviet boycott to authorise a United Nations military coalition to repel the North Korean aggression. In its absence, Security Council Resolution 83 was passed.

However, such fortunes were fleeting. From August 1950, the Soviet delegate returned and cast a negative vote (veto) on a UNSC draft resolution to condemn the aggression by the North Korean forces in the war. In response, the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson convinced the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to assume responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, as stated in Article 14 of the United Nations Charter.

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Taken from Article 14 of the United Nations Charter.

Resolution 377A(V): Circumventing the Veto
As a result, UNGA Resolution 377A(V) was passed, empowering the UNGA to hold an emergency special session (ESS) to make recommendations on collective measures to maintain international peace and security. This ESS may be called if requested by the UNSC “on the vote of any seven members [nine since 1965], or by a majority” of the member states.

If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures […] If not in session at the time, the General Assembly shall therefore meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request.

An excerpt taken from General Assembly Resolution 377A(V), 3 November 1950.

Also known as the ‘Uniting for Peace’ (UfP), its first application was observed during the Korean War. On 6 and 12 September 1950, the UfP was adopted in response to Soviet vetoes.

A more relevant case study is exemplified in the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. In response to French and British vetoes of a Resolution 119, the UfP was invoked by the UNSC, enabling the UNGA to hold its First Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in the Middle East”. Notably, Resolution 1000 was adopted, authorising the creation of the first peacekeeping force, known as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I).

The “Uniting for Peace” resolution pointed to the flexible, if not uncontested, mechanisms of the Charter that allowed the United Nations to take action even when the Security Council was blocked. Due to the contentious nature of the decision, this procedure has not been invoked very often. One instance was during the Suez crisis in 1956, when the General Assembly adopted a resolution to send a ten-nation peacekeeping force to supervise the cessation of hostilities. Such agreement was possible since the interests of the two superpowers converged, acting against the veto of France and Britain, which were directly involved in the conflict.

An excerpt taken from “The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society” by Jean E. Krasno.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that ‘Uniting for Peace’ has enhanced the political effectiveness of the United Nations General Assembly from 1950 to 1997?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the United Nations Standby Arrangement System - United Nations Notes

What is the United Nations Standby Arrangement System?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 3: UN Reforms

Historical context: Agenda for Peace
In 1992, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali published a report known as “An Agenda for Peace” in response to a request made by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to derive analysis and recommendations to enhance peacekeeping in the post-Cold War phase.

As a result, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was formed in March 1992 to focus on the planning, preparation and management of peacekeeping operations. Under Boutros-Ghali’s report, the DPKO served to enhance the United Nations’ capacity for peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy.

Hesitation: Operational Constraints
As one of the many UN reforms, this report led to the establishment of the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSC) in a year later. The UNSAS was meant to provide standby military forces that are deployable at short notice, so that peacekeeping operations can be carried out efficiently.

While member nations deliberated on the conditions for deployment, the ongoing peacekeeping mission in Somalia diminished the US willingness to support new operations. Over time, more member nations became worrying cautious.

Moreover, by May 1994, in the wake of disasters in Somalia and elsewhere, the Security Council was becoming more cautious than before about embarking on new peacekeeping missions. At the same time, many states were devising restrictive criteria about the circumstances in which they would be prepared to commit forces to UN operations. In May 1994, with the adoption of the Presidential Decision Directive 25, the US Government set firm limits regarding the situations in which the US would support the creation of, or be willing to participate in, UN peacekeeping forces.

An excerpt taken from “The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945” by Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum.

Enhancements to the Standby Arrangement System
In February 1995, the UNSC responded to Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace‘, asserting the urgent need to improve the capacity for ‘rapid deployment’ through existing stand-by arrangements. This Supplement included a suggestion to develop a rapid-reaction force to ensure that operational constraints could be minimised or even resolved.

UNSAS was designed to serve four overlapping objectives.

First, it seeks to provide the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations with a precise understanding of the forces and capabilities member states have available at an agreed state of readiness for peacekeeping.

Second, it aims to facilitate mission planning and force generation by helping to identify appropriate resources for a deployment, as well as options for contingency plans.

Third, UNSAS is designed to assist with rapid deployment. Although the arrangements are conditional, it is hoped that those members who have confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources will be more forthcoming and committed than might otherwise be the case.

Fourth, UNSAS should encourage member states to discuss and prepare for a possible contribution to a UN peacekeeping operation, providing guidance for plans, budgets, and appropriate training. In short, UNSAS provides an initial commitment to service and a better understanding of the requirements in advance.

An excerpt taken from “Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment” by Dr. H. Peter Langille.

Notably, the UNSAS also functions as a database system to keep track of potential troop-contributing countries (TCCs). However, these TCCs that pledge specific operational capabilities are conditional, meaning that contributions remain voluntary in nature. A United Nations request for permission to deploy these capabilities must be sort and financial compensation will be given after deployment.

Moreover, by May 1994, in the wake of disasters in Somalia and elsewhere, the Security Council was becoming more cautious than before about embarking on new peacekeeping missions. At the same time, many states were devising restrictive criteria about the circumstances in which they would be prepared to commit forces to UN operations. In May 1994, with the adoption of the Presidential Decision Directive 25, the US Government set firm limits regarding the situations in which the US would support the creation of, or be willing to participate in, UN peacekeeping forces.

Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum.

Is it enough: The Brahimi Report
Although the UNSAS was considered a work-in-progress in the 1990s, the United Nations still struggled to deploy its peacekeeping forces quickly, especially in cases when the missions are complex. In view of these setbacks, a Panel on UN Peace Operations was established in 2000 and chaired by the former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. It concluded with the publication of the Brahimi Report that listed recommendations for the improvement of peacekeeping operations.

D

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the effectiveness of United Nations reforms to maintain international peace and security in the 1990s.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.