JC History Tuition Online - How was Thailand affected by the Asian Financial Crisis

How was Thailand affected by the Asian Financial Crisis?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Economic Development after Independence
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 2: Asian Financial Crisis

Examine the causes of the regional currency crisis to understand its significance on Southeast Asia [Video by Business Explained]

Overview
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 was a devastating problem that impacted fast-growing economies in Southeast Asia. Before the crisis, the region was fuelled by unprecedented growth, as seen by the rise of the ‘Tiger economies’ like Singapore.

The epicentre: Thailand
With the Bank of Thailand (BOT) at the helm of the nation’s push for financial liberalisation from the 1980s to the early 1990s, few had expected the central bank to assume partial responsibility for the underlying problems.

Since the 1960s, the Thai baht was tied to the American dollar. This arrangement proved beneficial in accelerating the Thai government’s switch from import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) to export promotion. The establishment of export processing zones (EPZs) was carried out in tandem with the large capital inflows from newly industrialised economies, such as Taiwan.

Like a moth to a flame: Enter the BIBF
Furthermore, the BOT had accepted Article 8 of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Agreement on 20 May 1990. It meant that BOT agreed to open the Thai economy to a larger degree of financial liberalisation. Notably, the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) was formed in March 1993 as an offshore banking centre, turning the nation in to an investment hub that could compete with Singapore.

As a result of Thailand’s market-friendly measures, the economy gained from a tremendous amount of capital inflow.

In fact, between 1988 and 1996 Thailand was the recipient of the largest capital inflows relative to GDP in the world. According to the Bank of Thailand, between 1988 and 1996 Thailand received a staggering cumulative amount of US$100.3 billion, about 55 per cent of 1996 GDP, or 9.4 per cent of GDP on average per annum.

An excerpt from “The Asian Financial Crisis: Crisis, reform and recovery” by Shalendra Sharma.

An impending disaster
However, excessive capital inflow proved to be more detrimental than beneficial for Thailand. In particular, the influx of short-term capital, also known as ‘hot money‘, have debilitating effects on the economy, such as a widening current account deficit and an appreciation of the real exchange rate.

Although capital control measures were introduced on 8 August 1995, such responses proved futile. By mid-1997, Thailand’s external debt stood at US$94 billion. Its current account deficit was nearly 8.5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

In anticipation of the Thai government’s inability to finance their ever-growing foreign debt, foreign investors brought their money out of the nation. On 10 May 1996, the Bangkok Bank of Commerce (BBC) collapsed, causing widespread panic in the financial market. In December 1996, more than 50 percent of the companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) declared falling earnings. On 5 February 1997, Somprasong Land Company defaulted.

On 5 February came the first Thai default, by the company Somprasong, on a foreign loan repayment. Later that month, it was announced that the largest of the finance companies, Finance One, was seeking a merger with a bank to stave off collapse. In the face of widespread fears of an impending financial implosion, Financial Minister Amnuay and central bank governor Rerngchai Marakanond suspended trading of financial sector shares on the stock exchange and went on national television to announce a series of emergency measures designed to reassure nervous markets.

An excerpt from “The Asian Financial Crisis and the Architecture of Global Finance” by Gregory W. Noble and John Ravenhill.

Although the Thai Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh had claimed that the baht would never be allowed to devalue, a massive depreciation occurred on 2 July 1997. Subsequently, the Chavalit administration turned to the IMF for help.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the Asian Financial Crisis was inevitable?

Join our JC History Tuition and learn to answer essay questions on the Asian Financial Crisis. The H2 and H1 History Tuition features enriching and skills-oriented online classes to consolidate what you have learnt at school and apply them to examination-based questions. Get concise study notes and receive tutor feedback to correct your writing errors productively.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as GP TuitionEconomics TuitionJC Chemistry TuitionJC Math Tuition and China Studies in English Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English TuitionSecondary Math tuitionSecondary Chemistry Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English Tuition. Call 9689 0510 to learn more.

JC History Tuition Online - South China Sea dispute - Cartoon Analysis - ASEAN

South China Sea dispute – Cartoon Analysis

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Gain insights to understand the significance of the dispute
In the following section, we will be examining some political cartoons to comprehend the perceptions and interpretations by various authors on the South China Sea dispute. As JC students preparing for the GCE A Level History examination, it is important to refine your critical thinking skills by exploring diverse sources. Try to critique the strengths and limitations of each cartoon to test your level of understanding.

By Paresh Nath, The Khaleej Times, UAE, 20 August 2014.
About ASEAN’s repeated calls for the adherence to its ‘Code of Conduct’ while being surrounding by myriad claimants in the sea.
Cartoon by Paresh Nath, 10 July 2012.
Depiction of conflicting clams among Vietnam, the Philippines and China, while ASEAN struggles to remind all parties to follow the ‘Code of Conduct’.
By Paresh Nath, 27 July 2020.
About a Chinese ‘dragon’ surrounding the sea while other claimants look on helplessly.
Cartoon from Times of India, 31 October 2019.
ASEAN member states facing a menacing-looking whale that deployed Chinese vessels into the disputed territory.
An editorial cartoon from the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 April 2017.
ASEAN struggles in its responses towards a ‘militarised’ China in the West Philippine Sea.
Editorial cartoon on ASEAN unity and issue of the South China Sea dispute.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that ASEAN was successful in maintaining its regional security in the post-Cold War world?

Join our JC History Tuition to find out how to revise for the Source Based Case Study section in Paper 2. The H2 and H1 History Tuition programmes feature thematic revision for areas like The Cold War, Global Economy and the Asian Financial Crisis. Students can participate in free writing practices to find out what are the areas of improvement and raise their writing proficiency levels.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as GP TuitionEconomics TuitionJC Chemistry TuitionJC Math Tuition and China Studies in English Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English TuitionSecondary Math tuitionSecondary Chemistry Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English Tuition. Call 9689 0510 to learn more.

JC History Tuition Online - What was ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina War

What was ASEAN’s response to the Third Indochina War?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Essay Questions
Theme II Chapter 2: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991): ASEAN and the Cold War (ASEAN’s responses to Cold War bipolarity)

Historical context: A violation of national sovereignty
In December 1978, Vietnamese forces launched a full-scale assault, crossing the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.

In January 1979, the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh was occupied by an alternative government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

In the same month, Singapore joined other member nations for an urgent meeting. After much deliberation, ASEAN issued a joint statement to deplore the invasion, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

4. Towards this end, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers called for the immediate and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory.

5. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers welcomed the decision of the United Nations Security Council to consider without delay the situation in Indochina, and strongly urged the Council to take the necessary and appropriate measures to restore peace, security and stability in the area.

An excerpt from the “Joint Statement The Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting On The Current Political Development In The Southeast Asia Region Bangkok“, 12 January 1979.

Notably, ASEAN not only made a united stand against military aggression, but also called on the United Nations to address this escalating threat that had endangered regional stability.

Contestation by Great Powers
On 17 February 1979, China engaged in a military confrontation with Vietnam. Observers interpreted the attack as a hint to Moscow that China would not remain on the sidelines following the invasion. Yet, ASEAN members were increasingly concerned with the Chinese involvement in the conflict.

After much persuasion with member nations in the United Nations General Assembly, the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) was held from 13 to 17 July 1981. However, there were some shortcomings.

The pro-Communist bloc nations like Soviet Union and Vietnam were absent. Additionally, China had disagreed with ASEAN’s draft for the ICK, particularly the disarmament of Khmer resistance groups and the creation of an interim administration.

Singapore saw this inflexible Chinese position as evidence of Beijing not wanting an early solution, and that it was more interested in a protracted conflict to “bleed” Vietnam. Its ultimate objective was to use the armed forces of the Khmer Rouge to restore a pro-China regime in Phnom Penh, and hopefully see the emergence of a Chinese-friendly Vietnam. Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and Manila felt that ASEAN should not be seen to be succumbing to China’s pressure at this stage whereas Bangkok was more interested in accommodating China, as its overriding concern was to ensure that China could help defend Thailand against a Soviet-supported Vietnam.

An excerpt from “Singapore, ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict 1978-1991” by Ang Cheng Guan.

The situation had become even more complex when the US delegation sided with China. Then Foreign Minister of Singapore Dhanabalan had revealed that attempts to convince Big Powers like the USA and China had been challenging, given their diverging interests with ASEAN members during the Cold War.

I was surprised to note how keen the U.S. was to accommodate the PRC’s request. I explained to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State that it was not possible to accede to the PRC’s request as it was wrong and would also not get any support from the conference. He ended the meeting by threatening that he would go over my head and take the matter up with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore… It was a real life experience for me that interests and not principles determine the actions of big powers.

An excerpt from “The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats” by Tommy Koh and Li Lin Chang.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the challenges that ASEAN faced in response to the Third Indochina War.

Join our JC History Tuition to study how ASEAN managed various regional and international threats during the Cold War. The H2 and H1 History Tuition programmes feature online learning programmes to organise your content awareness and writing skills for essay and source based case study. We organise free writing practices for students to hone their answering techniques.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as GP TuitionEconomics TuitionJC Chemistry TuitionJC Math Tuition and China Studies in English Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English TuitionSecondary Math tuitionSecondary Chemistry Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English Tuition. Call 9689 0510 to find out more.

JC History Tuition Online - What is the Kuantan Doctrine - ASEAN Notes

What is the Kuantan Doctrine?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Essay Questions
Theme II Chapter 2: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991): ASEAN and the Cold War (ASEAN’s responses to Cold War bipolarity)

Historical context: A looming threat of Great Powers
In response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, the Indonesian President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn met in Kuantan in March 1980. Both parties agreed that the Cambodian conflict posed a grave threat to regional security, if left unchecked.

The threat extended beyond the presence of a pro-Vietnam government in Cambodia, particularly the dangers posed by the Soviet Union and China.

The joint statement issued by Malaysia and Indonesia took into consideration the broader security concerns of the two countries, such as the perceived threat posed by China and the increased influence of the Soviet Union in the region. The statement envisaged a Vietnam free from the influences of both China and the Soviet Union and took into consideration Vietnam’s security interests in Cambodia. In other words, the Kuantan Principle sought to bring Vietnam out of the Sino-Soviet dispute and to reduce the influence of these two powers in the region. It also displayed a less confrontational stand toward Vietnam over the Cambodian situation as compared with the ASEAN policy.

An excerpt from “Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor” by Keat Gin Ooi.

However, the Kuantan Doctrine was never put into practice as other member states of ASEAN rejected the proposed solution. For instance, the frontline member Thailand was concerned with its border security, given its proximity to Cambodia.

Soviet Union or China: A greater threat?
Although ASEAN eventually issued a joint statement to deplore the Vietnamese aggression, diverging perceptions among some member states had given rise to disagreements.

From Suharto’s point of view, China was deemed a more serious threat than Vietnam. As such, Indonesia put forward the idea of granting a certain degree of autonomy to Vietnam for its presence in Cambodia.

As the interlocutor of ASEAN on the Kampuchea issue, Indonesia was mainly concerned that the conflict might divide the region into two clusters: maritime ASEAN and Indochina under Vietnamese domination. Indonesia feared that a bipolar Southeast Asia could pit the communist against the non-communist states, thereby opening the door to intervention by external great powers.

An excerpt from “Indonesia’s Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order” by Christopher Roberts, Ahmad Habir and Leonard Sebastian.

On the other hand, both Thailand and Singapore perceived a Soviet-backed Vietnam as a more significant threat than China. To some political observers, inaction may mean that neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia condone sovereignty violation.

However, Singapore’s strident anti-communist posture was essentially aimed at the Soviet Union and its perceived regional proxy, Vietnam. Hence, curiously enough, whereas there was clear evidence of Chinese support for communist insurgency in Southeast Asia, the most aggressive policy pronouncements against communism were those aimed at the Soviet Union.

An excerpt from “Realism and Interdependence in Singapore’s Foreign Policy” by Narayanan Ganesan.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that Singapore’s foreign policy responses were successful during the Third Indochina War?

Join our JC History Tuition to study conflicts and challenges such as the Third Indochina War. The H2 and H1 History Tuition programmes feature online learning classes to develop sound thinking and writing skills. We provide concise study notes and hold guided writing practices to prepare you for the GCE A Level History examinations.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as GP TuitionEconomics TuitionJC Chemistry TuitionJC Math Tuition and China Studies in English Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English TuitionSecondary Math tuitionSecondary Chemistry Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary Online Tuition. Call 9689 0510 to find out more.