Who is U Thant?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Background
U Thant (သန့်) was appointed Secretary-General of the United Nations on 30 November 1961. It was six weeks after the distinguished Dag Hammarskjöld died in an air crash. U Thant was the first non-European Secretary-General. He served for two terms that eventually ended on 31 December 1971.

U Thant led diplomatic efforts in the different missions, such as the ongoing Congo Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa, the protracted Arab-Israeli War in the Middle East and the Vietnam War in Indochina.

U Thant’s Diplomacy
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, U Thant helped to pass messages between American and Soviet leaders, Kennedy and Khrushchev, averting a nuclear confrontation. U Thant also visited the Cuban leader Fidel Castro to oversee the smooth removal of missiles.

U Thant called for urgent negotiations, informing the Security Council that he had sent identical messages to Kennedy and Khrushchev appealing for a two- to three-week moratorium. […] U Thant received lavish praise inside and outside the Security Council for his part in helping defuse the crisis. In the Security Council on 25 October, Ambassador Quaison-Sackey expressed appreciation to U Thant for his “tremendous show of statesmanship and initiative.”

An excerpt taken from “Preventive Diplomacy at the UN” by Bertrand G. Ramcharan.

However, U Thant’s efforts were hindered by the United States. During the Vietnam War, he tried to mediate by arranging peace talks between Washington and Hanoi, but the Johnson administration rejected his proposals. The US Secretary of State Dean Rusk objected to U Thant’s ceasefire and peace talks in Rangoon. Rusk alleged that U Thant’s enthusiasm in facilitating peace talks was influenced by his desire to claim the Nobel Peace Prize.

The third UN Secretary-General, U Thant, made a spirited attempt to find a means of ending the disastrous Vietnam War. He evolved a plan for a cease-fire in place and for a meeting of all the parties in Rangoon, where all the diplomatic representation, to agree on how to negotiate a final end to the war.

[…] Nothing more was heard from Washington, and there is no written record of what Stevenson did about it, although it now seems likely that Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who distrusted U Thant’s efforts on Vietna, may have blocked it.

An excerpt taken from “Adlai Stevenson’s Lasting Legacy” by A. Liebling.

According to Sir Brian Urquhart, there was a stark contrast between the personality of U Thant and his predecessor Hammarskjöld. U Thant was viewed as a “simple and direct” individual who spoke few words, whereas Hammarskjöld was much more articulate.

[U Thant] was friendly, informal, and genuinely interested in what one had to say – in contrast to Hammarskjöld, who paid little heed to subordinates. U Thant also differed from his predecessor in more fundamental ways.

He was simple and direct where Hammarskjöld was complicated and nuanced; a man of few words where Hammarskjöld was immensely articulate; a devout traditional Buddhist where Hammarskjöld was increasingly inclined to a personal brand of mysticism; a man of imperturbable calm where Hammarskjöld could be highly emotional; a modest and unpretentious middlebrow where Hammarskjöld was intensely intellectual; a taker of advice where Hammarskjöld almost invariably stuck to his own opinion.

An excerpt taken from “Character Sketches: U Thant” by Brian Urquhart.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that U Thant was effective in performing his duties as the United Nations Secretary-General in the 1960s?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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How did the UN support decolonisation?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Historical context
After World War Two, Third World colonies in the Africa and Asia went through decolonisation. However, not all member states of the United Nations were supportive of decolonisation, particularly those that were former colonial powers. In the early 1950s, Indonesia raised its concerns over West Irian, which was still controlled by the Netherlands.

On August 17, 1954, a day chosen with appropriate concern for nationalist symbolism, the Indonesian representative to the United Nations requested the UN Secretary-General to place the West Irian question on the agenda of that year’s regular session of the General Assembly. […] When debate was begun on the issue, Indonesia came forth with ringing declarations of the case against colonial rule.

An excerpt taken from “The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia” by Herbert Feith.

Furthermore, the Cold War rivalry has hindered efforts at international cooperation. Although the USA has always been a strong advocate of decolonisation, its British ally convinced it not to express support for this process in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

Resolution 1514
During the fifteenth session of the UNGA, member states were called upon to vote for the independence of countries and end of colonial rule. Notably, the USA abstained, whereas the Soviet Union supported the draft resolution. In total, 89 voted for the resolution, whereas 9 abstained.

As a result, UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV) was passed, which was known as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

[…] 5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

An excerpt taken from General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– In view of Third World decolonisation, assess the challenges to the political effectiveness of the United Nations General Assembly.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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What is the Uniting for Peace resolution?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]:
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Historical context: The Acheson Plan
After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was able to capitalise on the Soviet boycott to authorise a United Nations military coalition to repel the North Korean aggression. In its absence, Security Council Resolution 83 was passed.

However, such fortunes were fleeting. From August 1950, the Soviet delegate returned and cast a negative vote (veto) on a UNSC draft resolution to condemn the aggression by the North Korean forces in the war. In response, the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson convinced the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to assume responsibility of maintaining international peace and security, as stated in Article 14 of the United Nations Charter.

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Taken from Article 14 of the United Nations Charter.

Resolution 377A(V): Circumventing the Veto
As a result, UNGA Resolution 377A(V) was passed, empowering the UNGA to hold an emergency special session (ESS) to make recommendations on collective measures to maintain international peace and security. This ESS may be called if requested by the UNSC “on the vote of any seven members [nine since 1965], or by a majority” of the member states.

If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures […] If not in session at the time, the General Assembly shall therefore meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request.

An excerpt taken from General Assembly Resolution 377A(V), 3 November 1950.

Also known as the ‘Uniting for Peace’ (UfP), its first application was observed during the Korean War. On 6 and 12 September 1950, the UfP was adopted in response to Soviet vetoes.

A more relevant case study is exemplified in the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. In response to French and British vetoes of a Resolution 119, the UfP was invoked by the UNSC, enabling the UNGA to hold its First Emergency Special Session on “The Situation in the Middle East”. Notably, Resolution 1000 was adopted, authorising the creation of the first peacekeeping force, known as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I).

The “Uniting for Peace” resolution pointed to the flexible, if not uncontested, mechanisms of the Charter that allowed the United Nations to take action even when the Security Council was blocked. Due to the contentious nature of the decision, this procedure has not been invoked very often. One instance was during the Suez crisis in 1956, when the General Assembly adopted a resolution to send a ten-nation peacekeeping force to supervise the cessation of hostilities. Such agreement was possible since the interests of the two superpowers converged, acting against the veto of France and Britain, which were directly involved in the conflict.

An excerpt taken from “The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society” by Jean E. Krasno.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that ‘Uniting for Peace’ has enhanced the political effectiveness of the United Nations General Assembly from 1950 to 1997?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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What is the United Nations Standby Arrangement System?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 3: UN Reforms

Historical context: Agenda for Peace
In 1992, the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali published a report known as “An Agenda for Peace” in response to a request made by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to derive analysis and recommendations to enhance peacekeeping in the post-Cold War phase.

As a result, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was formed in March 1992 to focus on the planning, preparation and management of peacekeeping operations. Under Boutros-Ghali’s report, the DPKO served to enhance the United Nations’ capacity for peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy.

Hesitation: Operational Constraints
As one of the many UN reforms, this report led to the establishment of the United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSC) in a year later. The UNSAS was meant to provide standby military forces that are deployable at short notice, so that peacekeeping operations can be carried out efficiently.

While member nations deliberated on the conditions for deployment, the ongoing peacekeeping mission in Somalia diminished the US willingness to support new operations. Over time, more member nations became worrying cautious.

Moreover, by May 1994, in the wake of disasters in Somalia and elsewhere, the Security Council was becoming more cautious than before about embarking on new peacekeeping missions. At the same time, many states were devising restrictive criteria about the circumstances in which they would be prepared to commit forces to UN operations. In May 1994, with the adoption of the Presidential Decision Directive 25, the US Government set firm limits regarding the situations in which the US would support the creation of, or be willing to participate in, UN peacekeeping forces.

An excerpt taken from “The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945” by Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum.

Enhancements to the Standby Arrangement System
In February 1995, the UNSC responded to Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Supplement to An Agenda for Peace‘, asserting the urgent need to improve the capacity for ‘rapid deployment’ through existing stand-by arrangements. This Supplement included a suggestion to develop a rapid-reaction force to ensure that operational constraints could be minimised or even resolved.

UNSAS was designed to serve four overlapping objectives.

First, it seeks to provide the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations with a precise understanding of the forces and capabilities member states have available at an agreed state of readiness for peacekeeping.

Second, it aims to facilitate mission planning and force generation by helping to identify appropriate resources for a deployment, as well as options for contingency plans.

Third, UNSAS is designed to assist with rapid deployment. Although the arrangements are conditional, it is hoped that those members who have confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources will be more forthcoming and committed than might otherwise be the case.

Fourth, UNSAS should encourage member states to discuss and prepare for a possible contribution to a UN peacekeeping operation, providing guidance for plans, budgets, and appropriate training. In short, UNSAS provides an initial commitment to service and a better understanding of the requirements in advance.

An excerpt taken from “Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment” by Dr. H. Peter Langille.

Notably, the UNSAS also functions as a database system to keep track of potential troop-contributing countries (TCCs). However, these TCCs that pledge specific operational capabilities are conditional, meaning that contributions remain voluntary in nature. A United Nations request for permission to deploy these capabilities must be sort and financial compensation will be given after deployment.

Moreover, by May 1994, in the wake of disasters in Somalia and elsewhere, the Security Council was becoming more cautious than before about embarking on new peacekeeping missions. At the same time, many states were devising restrictive criteria about the circumstances in which they would be prepared to commit forces to UN operations. In May 1994, with the adoption of the Presidential Decision Directive 25, the US Government set firm limits regarding the situations in which the US would support the creation of, or be willing to participate in, UN peacekeeping forces.

Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum.

Is it enough: The Brahimi Report
Although the UNSAS was considered a work-in-progress in the 1990s, the United Nations still struggled to deploy its peacekeeping forces quickly, especially in cases when the missions are complex. In view of these setbacks, a Panel on UN Peace Operations was established in 2000 and chaired by the former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi. It concluded with the publication of the Brahimi Report that listed recommendations for the improvement of peacekeeping operations.

D

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the effectiveness of United Nations reforms to maintain international peace and security in the 1990s.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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What does FELDA stand for?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Economic Development after Independence
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 1: Paths to Economic Development

Historical context
FELDA stands for ‘Federal Land Development Authority’. Under the Land Development Ordinance, FELDA was established on 1 July 1956. Its main function was oriented towards the development and relocation of land, striving to achieve poverty eradication. Land development projects were focused on the cultivation of oil palm and rubber.

In its initial stage of development from 1956 to 1970 its main function was to act as a lending body, providing funds to the state governments for land development. However, with the growing political importance of the overall rural programme (and thus land development which was a major component of this policy), FELDA was given in 1960 direct authority to open up and develop land throughout Malaysia.

An excerpt from “Group Farming in Asia: Experiences and Potentials” by John Wong.

Application of FELDA
FELDA was first put into practice in March 1957, relocating about 400 settlers over 1,680 hectares of land in Air Lanas, Kelantan. These settlers were picked from rural areas and assigned about 4 to 6 hectares of land to cultivate either rubber or oil palm. They were paid wages until their crops matured. In 1960, FELDA expanded its function to include the management of all land schemes and land development at the national level.

From that date its activities of land development and settlement rapidly increased until the present day when it has some 200 schemes throughout Peninsular Malaysia, with 40,000 settlers and their families, and sales in 1976 of M$357 million (US$145 million). In the twenty-year period from 1956 to 1976 FELDA has also opened up 967,000 acres of land and built up and an extensive processing and marketing apparatus for its products including 25 palm oil and rubber factories and bulk storage installations at Malaysia’s main ports.

An excerpt from “Group Farming in Asia: Experiences and Potentials” by John Wong.

In the 1990s, FELDA became a statutory board that generates its own income through diverse businesses. In particular, FELDA has formed private corporate entities to support its value chain of activities, such as FELDA Holding Berhad and FELDA Global Ventures.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that agricultural policies were most significant in promoting economic development?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Paths to Economic Development. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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What was the Six-Day War?

Topic of Study [For H1/H2 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Safeguarding International Peace and Security 
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme III Chapter 2: Political Effectiveness of the UN in maintaining international peace and security

Historical context
After the 1948 War of Independence and the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, tensions between Israel and the Arab nations in the Middle East remained high. Although the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was deployed as a peacekeeping force to monitor ceasefire and prevent a resurgence of conflict at the Egypt-Israel border from the 1957 to 1967, their contributions were short-lived.

On 16 May 1967, the Egyptian government requested the withdrawal of the UNEF I from Sinai. Although UN Secretary-General U Thant offered to re-deploy the peacekeepers to the Israeli side of the border, Israel rejected the request. By 31 May 1967, most contingents have departed by air.

In the same month, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared the closure of the Straits of Tiran, blocking access for Israeli vessels. The military was mobilised to gather along the border with Israel, setting the stage for the war.

Fearing an Arab backlash—their UNEF contingent, accused of pro-Israeli bias, was given forty-eight hours to leave Sinai—the Canadians abandoned the convoy idea in favor of reviving the Armistice Agreement and transplanting UNEF in Israel.

“The Canadians and the Europeans will not accept responsibility,” the president recorded in his diary, “They say it’s not their trouble, and they shouldn’t get into the Middle East right now.” Particularly intimidating was Nasser’s threat to fire on any ship attempting to break the blockade, and to suspend the flow of Arab oil to its owners.

An excerpt from “Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East” by Michael B. Oren.

The War: Operation Focus
On 5 June 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a coordinated aerial assault on Egypt. By the end of the day, the IDF laid waste to Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Israel had achieved air superiority over the Middle East.

On the ground, Israeli forces invaded the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. In a few days, Israelis had forced the Egyptians to retreat. On 7 June 1967, Israel re-captured Jerusalem after putting up a fierce resistance against Jordan. Two days later, Israeli tanks and soldiers retook Golan Heights from Syria.

It was 7:10 AM on June 5, 1967. One hundred eight-three sleek Israeli fighter jets glided smoothly through the dusty morning air. They passed over Tel Aviv, Israel, heading out over the Mediterranean Sea.

[…] What happened next surprised everyone watching and, later, the world. The Israeli fighter jets swept into Egypt from the sea and bombed Egyptian military positions.

That day, and the five days later that followed, would become known as the Six-Day War.

An excerpt from “The Six-Day War (War and Conflict in the Middle East)” by Matthew Broyles.

Resolution
On 10 June 1967, the United Nations brokered a ceasefire, putting an end to the violent confrontation. Although the Israelis celebrated their triumph against their Arab neighbours, the Arab leaders signed a resolution in August (known as The Khartoum Resolutions). The Arab states were resolved not to make peace with Israel, setting the stage for the Yom Kippur War six years later.

3. The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.

An excerpt from The Khartoum Resolutions, 1 September 1967.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you that the United Nations should not be blamed for the outbreak of the Six-Day War?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the United Nations. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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What was the Marshall Plan?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Global Economy (1945-2000)
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 1: Reasons for growth of the global economy

Topic of Study [For H2 and H1 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Cold War (1945-1991)
Section A: Source-based Case Study
Theme I Chapter 1: Emergence of Bipolarity after the Second World War II

A crisis like no other: Post-war economic conditions
By the end of the Second World War (WWII), most European nations in no shape to restart industrial production. The devastation wrought by aerial bombardment had destroyed many cities, turning citizens into refugees that were housed in temporary camps. Many turned to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) for aid and assistance, such as food and supplies.

Germany was one of those worst hit in the region. In West Germany, the economy was affected by the population change due to WWII. By 1945, death casualties amounted to 4 million by 1945. Additional millions were killed while in Soviet captivity. Even so, the West German population, which was less than 40 million in June 1939, grew to about 48 million by 1950.

The war had turned Germany into a land of refugees, for immigration from the East was preceded by the mass evacuation of urban dwellers during the Allied bombing campaign. By the end of the war, close to 9 million residents of German cities had taken refuge in the countryside. One- third of them were unable to return until 1947. One million residents had abandoned Berlin alone.

[…] The catastrophic living conditions and the unwelcome presence of refugees and expellees not only invoked social conflict and public distress; the inadequate housing supply was an impediment to economic recovery, too. With the millions displaced by war trapped in rural communities, urban industry could not find sufficient labour to lift production. Much of the working time and energy of the existing urban workforce was diverted to rubble removal and reconstruction efforts, often in the context of administrative work assignments under the command of the occupation authorities.

An excerpt taken from “The Economic Consequences of the War: West Germany’s Growth Miracle after 1945” by Tamás Vonyó.

Rehabilitation and recovery:
In the words of British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill, Europe was a “rubble-heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate”. In his speech addressed to the audience at the United Europe Committee Meeting in 1947, Churchill called to “promote the cause of united Europe” to “sweep away the horrors and miseries”.

In response to this urgent need for aid, the United States launched the European Recovery Program, which later more commonly known as the Marshall Plan. It was a US-led program named after the Secretary of State George C. Marshall to give aid to Western Europe for post-war reconstruction.

As a four-year plan that ran from 1948 to 1951, recipient nations would have the finances and other forms of support to rebuild their industries and essential infrastructure.

Eventually, sixteen countries accepted the Marshall Plan (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West Germany), which totaled $13.2 billion. In today’s dollars, the Plan would have amounted to a staggering $800 billion.

Between 1948 and 1952 (four and a quarter years), the United States transferred $13.2 billion to the sixteen Marshall Plan countries. Accounting for inflation over those years, the total was $14.3 billion (that is, in 1952 dollars). The aid was front-loaded, with 31 percent coming in 1948, 30 percent in 1949, 20 percent in 1950, 12 percent in 1951, and 8 percent in 1952. The largest recipients were the U.K. ($3.2 billion, or $32 billion today), France ($2.7 billion, or $27 billion today), Italy ($1.5 billion, or $15 billion today), and West Germany ($1.4 billion, or $14 billion today). Austria and Norway were the biggest beneficiaries per capita ($130, or $1,300 today).

An excerpt taken from “The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War” by Benn Steil.

Containment or recovery?
The Truman administration introduced the Marshall Plan not solely for the purpose of rehabilitating Europe. In addition, the support for post-war recovery was an effective approach to counter Soviet Communism.

The administration’s East European chiefs of mission would conclude that “any and all movements within world communism which tend to weaken and disrupt the Kremlin’s control within the communist world represent forces which are operating in the interests of the West and therefore should be encouraged and assisted.” These statements made clear that it was Soviet influence, rather than communism as such, that the United States would oppose through the use of economic and political levers.

An excerpt taken from “The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War” by Benn Steil.

Studying the importance of US aid
Although the Marshall Plan was no doubt significant in financing the post-war recovery of European nations, questions were raised over its extent of contributions as compared to other factors. As aptly described by Herbert C. Mayer, “like all economic miracles, the German Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) was the result of wise planning, hard work and well timed aid… the German recovery would not have been accomplished alone”.

Historical statistics suggest further that recovery had begun well before the currency reform and that it was not transformed into sustained growth until the early 1950s. […] the most important limiting factors of industrial expansion in post-war Germany, namely the urban housing shortage and the structural disproportions caused by the redrawing of borders, persisted for many years after 1948. Foreign aid did little to improve these conditions, for it was not substantial enough and it was not focused primarily on these critical bottlenecks.

[…] At the same time, fiscal policy was chiefly responsible for the price stability that made West Germany the object of envy in the Western world and which earlier accounts as well as most international observers considered to be the achievement of the German Bundesbank. In reality, and most of the time, monetary policy played second fiddle.

An excerpt taken from “The Economic Consequences of the War: West Germany’s Growth Miracle after 1945” by Tamás Vonyó.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that the post-war reconstruction of Europe can be explained by American aid?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Global Economy and the Cold War. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

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What does the flying geese model suggest?

Paper 1: Understanding the Global Economy (1945-2000)
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 3: Rise of Asian Tigers from 1970s to 1990s [South Korea and Taiwan] 

The Flying Geese model
According to the Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu, Asian economies could grow based on a ‘flying geese model’. (FG model). Akamatsu noted that ‘Wild geese fly in orderly ranks forming an inverse V, just as airplanes fly in formation‘. After Japan achieved rapid economic recovery in the post-WWII years, it took the lead in economic development, whereas its neighbouring countries like Taiwan and South Korea followed suit.

During the 1930s, a Japanese economist, Kaname Akamatsu, initially sketched out a long span of history involving the evolutionary interrelationships of a developing Asian country (Japan) with the advanced West. His interest was to examine how developing countries in general may catch up with the advanced ones through their mutual interactions.

[…] Akamatsu presents a stylized four-stage model of evolving trade patterns of a typical developing country along its development process (catching-up), where the existing manufactured products are clustered into two broad categories: “consumer goods” and “capital goods”.

An excerpt from “The Asian Developmental State and the Flying Geese Paradigm” by the United Nations Conferenceo n Trade and Development.

Application on Asian economies
Although the FG model was developed in the 1930s, academics have based their research on this model in subsequent decades. While Japan was at the forefront of economic development in Asia, the ‘four tiger’ economies, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, played catch up.

After the 1970s, when Japan moved into an upper ladder of technological-intensive sectors such as the automobile industry and machinery after the first energy crisis in 1973-74, Taiwan and Korea kept chasing behind Japan’s footstep by moving to an upper ladder of technological sophistication with some varieties in the second phase; while Korea developed its brand name of automobiles, Taiwan, due to the limit of domestic market for scale economy, chose to develop auto parts and machinery tools instead of manufacturing the whole passenger cars.

An excerpt from “A Century of Development in Taiwan: From Colony to Modern State” by Peter C. Y. Chow.

For Taiwan, the government emulated Japan by focusing on labour-intensive production and exported to industrialised economies, like the USA, in the 1960s. In the 1970s, Taiwan then shifted from labour-driven to capital-oriented industries in response to rise labour and import costs, which were exacerbated by the twin oil shocks.

To some extent, it was the ‘flying geese’ pattern of industrial development by following the footstep of Japan’s industrialisation in the post-war era. Meier argued that it was a process of ‘learning by exporting’ by picking up the industrial sectors that Japan left when it moved up on the ‘ladder of comparative advantage’.

[…] Taiwan, as one of the first tier of the flying geese, faced more competition in the second stage of EP (export promotion) from the second tier followers in South East Asia and China after its economic reform and openness.

An excerpt from “Connecting Taiwan: Participation – Integration – Impacts” by Carsten Storm.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the importance of the ‘Flying Geese’ model in explaining the phenomenal growth of Taiwan from the 1970s to 1980s.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the rise of Asian Tiger economies and the Global Economy. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

Why is Myanmar’s military so powerful?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Search for Political Stability
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme I Chapter 1: Approaches to Governance

Historical Context: Humble beginnings
4 January 1948 marked the newly-independent Union of Burma. Initially, the Burmese military was led by a Karen, General Smith Dun. Later, Dun was replaced by a Burma, General Ne Win. In the mid-1950s, the Tatmadaw (official name for the armed forces of Myanmar) numbered only 110,000.

While Mountbatten accepted Aung San’s recommendation of Bo Let Ya as junior Deputy Inspector General, he chose Colonel Smith Dun, a rapidly promoted officer of Karen ethnicity, as the other and slightly more senior Deputy Inspector General from the old Burma army.

[…] Ne Win was then appointed as the Deputy Defence Minister. Under the new dispensation, Smith Dun, as Chief of the General Staff, was to have direct access to the Prime Minister in case of disagreements with Ne Win, an arrangement which the BSM chief, General Bourne, founded highly unsatisfactory.

An excerpt from “General Ne Win: A Political Biography” by Robert Taylor.

The military was charged with the responsibility to maintain social and political order. As Prime Minister U Nu’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government was beset by two communist rebellions and minority revolts, the democratic leader turned to General Ne Win for help.

After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the remnant Kuomintang (KMT) forces fled into northern Burma, biding time to launch resistance movements on the mainland. U Nu was concerned that the Chinese confrontation may spill over into the northern parts of Burma.

Caretaker Government (1958-1960)
Although elections were scheduled to be held in 1958, the AFPFL was increasingly fractured due to divisive political views. U Nu’s decision to pardon leftist soldiers had alarmed the military. These soldiers supported the National United Front, which demanded to join the military.

To prevent Burma from being plunged into a civil war, U Nu made reference to the constitution, allowing the military to take over. During this two-year period, the military was tasked to restore law and order and prepare the nation for elections.

Senior military personnel approached the prime minister suggesting that he allow the military to take over for a period (initially six months that was extended to about eighteen months) to avoid internal conflict. The legislature agreed; it was characterized as a “coup by consent” or a “pseudo-constitutional-peaceful-military coup d’état ”. “U Nu took the constitutional way out and Ne Win the constitutional way in.

[…] The “caretaker” military forcibly lowered prices in the bazaars, removed over 160,000 illegal squatters from downtown Rangoon to the rice paddies of the suburbs (the military repeated this in 1988/89), diminished insurgent control, negotiated the Chinese border agreement (signed later by U Nu), eliminated the legal authority of the hereditary ethnic Shan and Kayah leaders, and passed a universal (male-female) military conscription law passed (but never enforced) on an Israeli model.

An excerpt taken from “The Military in Burma/Myanmar: On the Longevity of Tatmadaw Rule” by David I. Steinberg.

General elections were then held on 6 February 1960 after the military voluntarily handed over to a civilian government for democratic processes to persist. U Nu’s ‘Clean AFPFL’ won 158 seats, whereas Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe’s ‘Stable AFPFL’ won 41 seats. The leftist NUF won only 3 seats.

During the elections, U Nu campaigned the promotion of Buddhism as the state religion, which angered the Kachin minority. Notably, the the military was partly comprised of Kachins, which may have influenced the decision for a military-led revolt. General Ne Win objected to the pro-Buddhist policies of U Nu as the some of the military personnel were Christians.

Enter the Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962): The Coup & Pre-eminence of the Military
After the military coup on 2 March 1962, a 17-man military council formed the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). Subsequently, the BSPP imposed strict laws to curtail political freedom.

Over the next couple of years, all other political parties were banned, censorship imposed, student protests violently suppressed, the judicial system destroyed, the bureaucracy purged of senior officials, foreigners (especially Indians—those from the subcontinent—and Chinese) expelled, and a nationalization of all industry begun. Buddhist monks were finally registered, and in 1982 a highly nationalistic citizenship law was enacted. To run a socialist government requires a talented bureaucracy, but it had been decimated. Eminent Burmese economists left the country.

An excerpt taken from “The Military in Burma/Myanmar: On the Longevity of Tatmadaw Rule” by David I. Steinberg.

Overall, the military dominated nearly all aspects, the economy, politics and even the society. For instance, 15,000 businesses were nationalised, enabling the military to run the economy. The BSPP expanded its organisation, including 99,000 ‘candidate’ members and 167,000 ‘sympathisers’. The Tatmadaw formed a Central School of Political Science in 1963 and trained over 29,000 cadres. These cadres replaced the civilian elites that initially occupied civil service sectors.

In 1974, a new constitution was developed, legitimising the BSPP as the sole party.

On 3 January 1974, the Constitution was enacted. It constitutionalised a single party system with the BSPP as the sole political party. It established a unicameral legislature as the most powerful state organ. The Council of State was formed from the members of the unicameral legislature and remained responsible to it. The unicameral legislature elected all major bodies including the Council of Ministers, the Council of People’s Justices, the Council of People’s Attorneys and the Council of People’s Inspectors. Members of the Pyithu Hluttaw were in theory directly elected, and elections were to be held every four years. Elections were held in 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1985. These elections, however, usually only had one candidate for each seat.

An excerpt taken from “The Constitution of Myanmar: A Contextual Analysis” by Melissa Crouch.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that military intervention in the politics of independent Southeast Asia led to increased political stability?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Approaches to Governance. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

How did Singapore respond to the Cambodian Crisis of 1979?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Essay Questions
Theme II Chapter 2: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991): ASEAN and the Cold War (ASEAN’s responses to Cold War bipolarity)

Prelude to the CGDK: An enervating meeting
In view of the Vietnamese invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia in the late 1970s, ASEAN and its member nations including Singapore became increasingly concerned with this challenge posed to regional security.

In 1979, the Thai Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun and the Singapore Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam met the members of the outsted Pol Pot regime, such as Kheiu Samphan and Ieng Sary. During the meeting, Thailand and Singapore deliberated on the inclusion of other Cambodian factions to oppose the pro-Vietnamese puppet regime under Heng Samrin.

Notably, this meeting had set the stage for the creation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in June 1982. Rajaratnam made it clear to the Pol Pot leaders that they had to take a backseat, while the other two groups, namely Sihanouk’s royalist faction and anti-communists under Son Sann, led the coalition. This was because of the controversial atrocities committed Pol Pot regime in the 1970s that would have hindered efforts to garner international support.

Minister Rajaratnam reminded them of the horrors [the Pol Pot regime] had perpetrated and that they had no chance of getting international support without forming a coalition with other nationalist groups. […] While this discussion was going on, I observed that Ieng Sary’s wife, Ieng Thirith, was giving fierce looks at our Minister, boiling with anger, breathing heavily with chest heaving and subsiding as she listened to her husband’s requests being rejected. [..] We prevailed because they had no choice. We thus cobbled together a coalition under Prince Sihanouk.

An excerpt from a chapter entitled “Scenes from the Cambodian Drama” by Mr. S. Dhanabalan in “The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats” by Tommy Koh and Chang Li Lin.

Interactions with China
During a special International Conference on Cambodia in 1980, ASEAN had lobbied for a United Nations resolution to demand the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. During the Conference, a delegation that represented the People’s Republic of China (PRC) asserted that the Pol Pot regime should be reinstated, which drew criticisms due to moral and pragmatic reasons.

The Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nian Long alleged that Singapore was involved in a conspiracy to influence the attendees of the Conference to oppose the return of the Pol Pot regime. In response, Dhanabalan disagreed, stating that there was an overwhelming majority that was against this move.

I was surprised to note how keen the U.S. was to accommodate the PRC’s request. I explained to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State that it was not possible to accede to the PRC’s request as it was wrong and would not get any support from the conference. He ended the meeting by threatening that he would go over my head and take the matter up with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore.

[…] PM Lee sent a note to the effect that the Foreign Minister represented the Singapore’s government’s position at the conference. It was a real life experience for me that interests and not principles determine the actions of big powers. The International Conference on Cambodia adopted a resolution that reflected ASEAN’s position.

An excerpt from a chapter entitled “Scenes from the Cambodian Drama” by Mr. S. Dhanabalan in “The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats” by Tommy Koh and Chang Li Lin.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the political effectiveness of Singapore’s efforts in response to the Third Indochina War.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Regional Conflicts and Cooperation. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.