Why is Myanmar’s military so powerful?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Search for Political Stability
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme I Chapter 1: Approaches to Governance

Historical Context: Humble beginnings
4 January 1948 marked the newly-independent Union of Burma. Initially, the Burmese military was led by a Karen, General Smith Dun. Later, Dun was replaced by a Burma, General Ne Win. In the mid-1950s, the Tatmadaw (official name for the armed forces of Myanmar) numbered only 110,000.

While Mountbatten accepted Aung San’s recommendation of Bo Let Ya as junior Deputy Inspector General, he chose Colonel Smith Dun, a rapidly promoted officer of Karen ethnicity, as the other and slightly more senior Deputy Inspector General from the old Burma army.

[…] Ne Win was then appointed as the Deputy Defence Minister. Under the new dispensation, Smith Dun, as Chief of the General Staff, was to have direct access to the Prime Minister in case of disagreements with Ne Win, an arrangement which the BSM chief, General Bourne, founded highly unsatisfactory.

An excerpt from “General Ne Win: A Political Biography” by Robert Taylor.

The military was charged with the responsibility to maintain social and political order. As Prime Minister U Nu’s Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) government was beset by two communist rebellions and minority revolts, the democratic leader turned to General Ne Win for help.

After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the remnant Kuomintang (KMT) forces fled into northern Burma, biding time to launch resistance movements on the mainland. U Nu was concerned that the Chinese confrontation may spill over into the northern parts of Burma.

Caretaker Government (1958-1960)
Although elections were scheduled to be held in 1958, the AFPFL was increasingly fractured due to divisive political views. U Nu’s decision to pardon leftist soldiers had alarmed the military. These soldiers supported the National United Front, which demanded to join the military.

To prevent Burma from being plunged into a civil war, U Nu made reference to the constitution, allowing the military to take over. During this two-year period, the military was tasked to restore law and order and prepare the nation for elections.

Senior military personnel approached the prime minister suggesting that he allow the military to take over for a period (initially six months that was extended to about eighteen months) to avoid internal conflict. The legislature agreed; it was characterized as a “coup by consent” or a “pseudo-constitutional-peaceful-military coup d’état ”. “U Nu took the constitutional way out and Ne Win the constitutional way in.

[…] The “caretaker” military forcibly lowered prices in the bazaars, removed over 160,000 illegal squatters from downtown Rangoon to the rice paddies of the suburbs (the military repeated this in 1988/89), diminished insurgent control, negotiated the Chinese border agreement (signed later by U Nu), eliminated the legal authority of the hereditary ethnic Shan and Kayah leaders, and passed a universal (male-female) military conscription law passed (but never enforced) on an Israeli model.

An excerpt taken from “The Military in Burma/Myanmar: On the Longevity of Tatmadaw Rule” by David I. Steinberg.

General elections were then held on 6 February 1960 after the military voluntarily handed over to a civilian government for democratic processes to persist. U Nu’s ‘Clean AFPFL’ won 158 seats, whereas Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe’s ‘Stable AFPFL’ won 41 seats. The leftist NUF won only 3 seats.

During the elections, U Nu campaigned the promotion of Buddhism as the state religion, which angered the Kachin minority. Notably, the the military was partly comprised of Kachins, which may have influenced the decision for a military-led revolt. General Ne Win objected to the pro-Buddhist policies of U Nu as the some of the military personnel were Christians.

Enter the Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962): The Coup & Pre-eminence of the Military
After the military coup on 2 March 1962, a 17-man military council formed the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). Subsequently, the BSPP imposed strict laws to curtail political freedom.

Over the next couple of years, all other political parties were banned, censorship imposed, student protests violently suppressed, the judicial system destroyed, the bureaucracy purged of senior officials, foreigners (especially Indians—those from the subcontinent—and Chinese) expelled, and a nationalization of all industry begun. Buddhist monks were finally registered, and in 1982 a highly nationalistic citizenship law was enacted. To run a socialist government requires a talented bureaucracy, but it had been decimated. Eminent Burmese economists left the country.

An excerpt taken from “The Military in Burma/Myanmar: On the Longevity of Tatmadaw Rule” by David I. Steinberg.

Overall, the military dominated nearly all aspects, the economy, politics and even the society. For instance, 15,000 businesses were nationalised, enabling the military to run the economy. The BSPP expanded its organisation, including 99,000 ‘candidate’ members and 167,000 ‘sympathisers’. The Tatmadaw formed a Central School of Political Science in 1963 and trained over 29,000 cadres. These cadres replaced the civilian elites that initially occupied civil service sectors.

In 1974, a new constitution was developed, legitimising the BSPP as the sole party.

On 3 January 1974, the Constitution was enacted. It constitutionalised a single party system with the BSPP as the sole political party. It established a unicameral legislature as the most powerful state organ. The Council of State was formed from the members of the unicameral legislature and remained responsible to it. The unicameral legislature elected all major bodies including the Council of Ministers, the Council of People’s Justices, the Council of People’s Attorneys and the Council of People’s Inspectors. Members of the Pyithu Hluttaw were in theory directly elected, and elections were to be held every four years. Elections were held in 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1985. These elections, however, usually only had one candidate for each seat.

An excerpt taken from “The Constitution of Myanmar: A Contextual Analysis” by Melissa Crouch.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that military intervention in the politics of independent Southeast Asia led to increased political stability?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Approaches to Governance. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

How did Singapore respond to the Cambodian Crisis of 1979?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Regional Conflicts and Co-operation
Source Based Case Study
Theme III Chapter 2: ASEAN (Growth and Development of ASEAN: Building regional peace and security – relations between ASEAN and external powers)

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Essay Questions
Theme II Chapter 2: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991): ASEAN and the Cold War (ASEAN’s responses to Cold War bipolarity)

Prelude to the CGDK: An enervating meeting
In view of the Vietnamese invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia in the late 1970s, ASEAN and its member nations including Singapore became increasingly concerned with this challenge posed to regional security.

In 1979, the Thai Foreign Minister Upadit Pachariyangkun and the Singapore Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam met the members of the outsted Pol Pot regime, such as Kheiu Samphan and Ieng Sary. During the meeting, Thailand and Singapore deliberated on the inclusion of other Cambodian factions to oppose the pro-Vietnamese puppet regime under Heng Samrin.

Notably, this meeting had set the stage for the creation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in June 1982. Rajaratnam made it clear to the Pol Pot leaders that they had to take a backseat, while the other two groups, namely Sihanouk’s royalist faction and anti-communists under Son Sann, led the coalition. This was because of the controversial atrocities committed Pol Pot regime in the 1970s that would have hindered efforts to garner international support.

Minister Rajaratnam reminded them of the horrors [the Pol Pot regime] had perpetrated and that they had no chance of getting international support without forming a coalition with other nationalist groups. […] While this discussion was going on, I observed that Ieng Sary’s wife, Ieng Thirith, was giving fierce looks at our Minister, boiling with anger, breathing heavily with chest heaving and subsiding as she listened to her husband’s requests being rejected. [..] We prevailed because they had no choice. We thus cobbled together a coalition under Prince Sihanouk.

An excerpt from a chapter entitled “Scenes from the Cambodian Drama” by Mr. S. Dhanabalan in “The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats” by Tommy Koh and Chang Li Lin.

Interactions with China
During a special International Conference on Cambodia in 1980, ASEAN had lobbied for a United Nations resolution to demand the immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. During the Conference, a delegation that represented the People’s Republic of China (PRC) asserted that the Pol Pot regime should be reinstated, which drew criticisms due to moral and pragmatic reasons.

The Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Han Nian Long alleged that Singapore was involved in a conspiracy to influence the attendees of the Conference to oppose the return of the Pol Pot regime. In response, Dhanabalan disagreed, stating that there was an overwhelming majority that was against this move.

I was surprised to note how keen the U.S. was to accommodate the PRC’s request. I explained to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State that it was not possible to accede to the PRC’s request as it was wrong and would not get any support from the conference. He ended the meeting by threatening that he would go over my head and take the matter up with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore.

[…] PM Lee sent a note to the effect that the Foreign Minister represented the Singapore’s government’s position at the conference. It was a real life experience for me that interests and not principles determine the actions of big powers. The International Conference on Cambodia adopted a resolution that reflected ASEAN’s position.

An excerpt from a chapter entitled “Scenes from the Cambodian Drama” by Mr. S. Dhanabalan in “The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats” by Tommy Koh and Chang Li Lin.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the political effectiveness of Singapore’s efforts in response to the Third Indochina War.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Regional Conflicts and Cooperation. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

What is the purpose of Tripoli Agreement?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Search for Political Stability
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme I Chapter 2: Approaches to National Unity

Historical Background: Moro Muslim separatism
In May 1968, the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was formed in the wake of the ‘Corregidor Affair‘, in which the Philippine armed forces was being criticised for causing the killing of Moro Muslim soldiers for a secret operation to take over Sabah. The MIM aimed to lead political activities to create a separate Moro state in southern Philippines.

In October 1972, younger leaders of the MIM formed a splinter group known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Pulau Pangkor, Malaysia. They viewed the older Moro elites in the MIM as ineffective.

Conflagration: Martial Law of 1972
On 23 September 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law, claiming that the growing violence between Christians and Muslims and the rise of an illegal separatist movement necessitated the use of authoritarian measures. In response, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were deployed to suppress the Moro Muslim rebellions.

Within two months after the declaration of martial rule, in November 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front-Bangsa Moro Army (MNLF-BMA) launched a series of coordinated attacks on military outposts and announced to the world the struggle for independence of the Bangsa Moro. It declared the entirety of Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago and Palawan as the ancestral homeland of the Bangsa Moro. Its battlecry: “Victory or to the graveyard!”

An excerpt from “The Minoritization of Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago” by Rudy Buhay Rodil.

The MNLF operated from Malaysia and received military aid from abroad, notably Libya and Malaysia. One key figure of the MNLF, Hashim Salamat, made a personal visit to Libya and convinced the government to switch support from the MIM to the MNLF. Over time, more Moro rebels joined the MNLF, leading to the expansion of the separatist movement.

In 1974, the AFP led a major military operation to defeat the MNLF separatists. On the other hand, the MNLF stood their ground, receiving help from its external supporters. For instance, military advisors from Libya helped the MNLF to utilise guerilla tactics to oppose the AFP.

The Tripoli Agreement: An illusory peace?
In July 1975, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) urged the Marcos government to reach a political settlement with the MNLF. The OIC is an inter-governmental organisation founded in 1969 to safeguard Muslim interests around the world and achieve peace and harmony.

On 23 December 1976, the Philippine government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement. It created the first autonomous region in the southern Philippines, including areas like Basilan, Palawan and Sulu. The Agreement meant to grant the autonomous government to have an executive council, legislative assembly, financial system and special regional security forces.

The Tripoli Agreement also benefited Marcos. The Philippine Armed Forces also badly needed a ceasefire. By approving an agreement which at first appeared to contain substantive concessions on his part, Marcos managed to reduce Islamic Conference pressure and even neutralize the Libyans, the MNLF’s strongest supporters. Moreover, Marcos held the power to implement the agreement as he saw fit.

An excerpt from “The Philippines Reader: A History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance” by Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom.

When the MNLF requested Marcos to implement the Tripoli Agreement by executive order, he submitted it to a referendum within the provinces that would be part of the newly-proposed autonomous region instead. On 17 April 1977, a majority of voters objected the Agreement.

Given that the Agreement failed to create a unified autonomous region led by the MNLF, the leaders ended talks with the Marcos government and rallied its members to resume guerilla attacks and demand complete independence. Notably, MNLF leaders Hashim Salamat and Nur Misuari left the group and established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Salamat asserted that the MNLF should have pursued the goal of creating an Islamic nation.

However, on 4 January the Philippine government announced that a referendum would be held in the southern provinces to ascertain which wanted to be autonomous; other areas could have their own referenda, so diluting the Muslim character of the south. Gaddafi did not like the sound of this, and the MNLF flatly rejected the idea of a referendum. To sweeten the pill Marcos promised a conditional amnesty for Muslim rebels in the south and then promulgated new laws for a Muslim court system. The fresh talks in Tripoli collapse, the Marcos envoy returned to Manila, and the MNLF threatened to resume hostilities; by now the Moros were demanding their own flag, their own army, and the incorporation of three Christian provinces (offering offshore oil and good farmland) into the Muslim area.

An excerpt from “Libya: The Struggle for Survival ” by G L Simons and Isaline Bergamaschi.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the political reasons that explain the rise of separatism in independent Southeast Asian states.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Approaches to National Unity. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

What is the Free Aceh Movement?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Search for Political Stability
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme I Chapter 2: Approaches to National Unity

Historical Background
Aceh is located in the north-western tip of Sumatra. Notably, the Acehnese supported the practice of Islam. In the 1950s, Aceh rallied behind the Darul Islam rebellion, which resulted in a partial acceptance by the Sukarno government to grant a ‘special region’ status for Aceh. It was seen as an accommodative response by the government, enabling the Acehnese to manage their own matters relating to religion, education and customary law.

To put an end to the violence, Aceh was granted the status ‘Special Region of Aceh’ (Daerah Istimewa Aceh) in 1959, supposedly having autonomy in matters pertaining to Religion, Education and Customary law. However, most Acehnese claim that this ‘special status’ is a farce because on most occasions, the central government in Jakarta enforces its national laws, even when these laws completely contradict local customs. For example, in the late 1980s when the central government announced a national anti-jilbab (veil) policy – Aceh was also forced to bow down to national policy.

An excerpt from “Gender, Islam, Nationalism and the State in Aceh: The Paradox of Power, Co-optation and Resistance” by Joy Aquino Siapno.

However, problems began to surface due to growing discontent over two reasons. First, the transmigration policy involved the relocation of workers from the overpopulated Java to other islands, including Aceh. Consequently, Javanese immigrants occupied the mountains and industrial zones on the Aceh coast, cutting off Acehnese access to fish and rice for subsistence.

Second, public discontent related to the distribution of Aceh’s natural resource. Although the Aceh supplies thirty percent of Indonesian oil and natural gas by the late 1980s, it was still one of the poorest provinces in the country.

Free Aceh Movement
A former Darul Islam leader Hasan di Tiro formed the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) in December 1976. The separatists aimed to create an independent Islamic state. GAM went through four key phases, the late 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s as result of military operations launched by Jakarta. Under Suharto’s New Order, the Indonesian army (Tentera Nasional Indonesia, TNI) mobilised its troops to quell the separatist insurgencies from the late 1970s to 1990s.

Tensions continued to rise, and in 1989, the civil war resumed. Attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Scandinavian-based exiled leadership were halfhearted at best. The war was bloody and very costly for GAM, with several thousand members killed. The TNI increased its presence in the province throughout the 1990s, reaching a peak of thirty thousand troops (the police were part of the army until 1999).

[…] GAM’s fourth phase began in 1999 with a renewed offensive to take advantage of the collapse of the Suharto regime/military-backed government. The system of civilian administration by the military ended, though civil administration was very weak. The military was on the defensive for human rights abuses and its role in keeping Suharto in power, so GAM seized the initiative and launched a wave of attacks. GAM truly believed that Indonesia was on the cusp of being a failed state and that independence was inevitable.

An excerpt from “Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Reconciliation” by Zachary Abuza.

Peaceful resolution and an unexpected national disaster
In December 2002, GAM and the Indonesian government signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, allowing for temporary ceasefire between the parties. Although the agreement broke down, GAM ceased hostilities after a massive earthquake in the Indian Ocean occurred on 26 December 2004, which caused a tsunami that affected numerous Acehnese. Both the GAM and government focused on providing humanitarian relief to the affected people.

In February 2005, another round of peace talks were held in Finland. Five months later, a peace deal was finally reached, ending the three decade-long insurgency.

The Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) confirm their commitment to a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh with dignity for all.

The parties commit themselves to creating conditions within which the government of the Acehnese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

The parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful settlement of the conflict will enable the rebuilding of Aceh after the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to progress and succeed.

An excerpt from “Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement”, 15 August 2005.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that minority responses were most important in affecting government efforts to forge national unity?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Approaches to National Unity. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

What role did Boris Yeltsin play in the collapse of the Soviet Union?

Topic of Study [For H2 and H1 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Cold War (1945-1991)
Section A: Source-based Case Study
Theme I Chapter 3: End of Bipolarity [Collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War]

Cracks within the political system: A failed last ditch attempt
Since 1988, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev embarked on ambitious reforms, namely the perestroika and glasnost that reshaped the Soviet system. However, Gorbachev was faced with a problem. Soviet republics began to break away from the USSR, threatening its very existence.

In response, the Soviet leader proposed the New Union Treaty, which was submitted to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on 23 November 1990. Yet, six of the fifteen Soviet republics (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were determined to declare independence. The remaining nine republics comprised of Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan.

Meanwhile, within the Soviet government, Gorbachev faced a bigger threat. Hardline politicians and military officials have begun to lose confidence in Gorbachev’s leadership, thinking that he was on the verge of bringing the Soviet Union to utter ruin. Notably, President Boris Yeltsin commented that the Soviet leader was not working fast enough.

From the outset, members of the elite had held different views about the reforms, with no one sure of the consequences of what they were doing, but some unutterably opposed. By 1989, that elite was split in three ways. […] Another, more conservative group opposed the course of reform. Some of these believed that all sorts of change were wrong, others accepted that some changes was needed but argued that the changes espoused by Gorbachev went too far too fast. […] The third group was headed by Boris Yeltsin, and believed that Gorbachev’s reforms went neither far enough nor fast enough.

An excerpt from “Building an Authoritarian Polity: Russia in Post-Soviet Times” by Graeme Gill.

The August Coup: Yeltsin’s resistance
On 18 August 1991, high-ranking officials that were hard-liners within the government placed Gorbachev under house arrest in Crimea. Although he was pressured to resign, Gorbachev declined to do so. Former vice president Gennady Yanayev came up with an excuse that Gorbachev was ‘ill’, so a state of emergency was declared. Then, the coup leaders (also known as the ‘Gang of Eight’) tried to take control of the government.

The following is a translated excerpt of Yeltsin’s speech in front of the parliament building, in which he denounced the coup and called for a general strike.

Citizens of Russia: On the night of 18-19 August 1991, the legally elected president of the country was removed from power.

Regardless of the reasons given for his removal, we are dealing with a rightist, reactionary, anti-constitutional coup. Despite all the difficulties and severe trials being experienced by the people, the democratic process in the country is acquiring an increasingly broad sweep and an irreversible character.

The peoples of Russia are becoming masters of their destiny. The uncontrolled powers of unconstitutional organs have been considerably limited, and this includes party organs.

An excerpt from President of the Russian republic Boris Yeltsin’s address to the Russian people, 19 August 1991.

In view of these shocking events, Yeltsin stepped up and called on the Russian civilians to oppose the coup. In a historic moment, Yeltsin climbed aboard a tank and spoke through a megaphone. He called the coup a ‘new reign of terror’ and even convinced some of the soldiers to join hands with the civilians to protest the coup. In three days’ time, the coup finally came to an end. Gorbachev was released.

The rise of Yeltsin: A new Russia
On 8 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, as well as the Presidents of Ukraine and Belarus (Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich) met to sign an agreement for the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Instead, a new entity known as the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) would form the Russian federation. From then on, Yeltsin would legally become the de facto leader.

The news about Yeltsin’s speech on the top of a tank on the Red Square broke around the world. […] His rival Mikhail Gorbachev returned to his position of President of the weakened Union. But the power was already in the hands of Boris Yeltsin as President of the Russian Republic. He knew how to use power in order to eliminate his rivals. […] However, the better option for Yeltsin would be to dissolve it. The dissolution of the Soviet Union would immediately imply the elimination of the position of the President of the Union and thus the political death of the incumbent Mikhail Gorbachev.

An excerpt from “Global Trends in Eastern Europe” by Nikolai Genov.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the political factors that have caused the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the End of the Cold War. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

What was Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative?

Topic of Study [For H2 and H1 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Cold War (1945-1991)
Section A: Source-based Case Study
Theme I Chapter 3: End of Bipolarity [US policy of renewed containment and confrontation]

Historical context: Peace through strength
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the short-lived Détente was over, ushering a time know as the ‘Second Cold War‘. Then, US President Ronald Reagan assumed a more confrontational stance against the Soviet Union, asserting that the ‘Evil Empire’ had to deterred through military build-up.

By the early 1980s, there were anti-nuclear demonstrations taking place in the USA, which had put pressure on Washington to support ‘nuclear freeze’. Yet, Reagan opposed this approach, claiming that the Soviet Union’s aggression would put the USA and its people in grave danger.

I know too that many of you seriously believe that a nuclear freeze would further the cause of peace. But a freeze now would make us less, not more, secure and would raise, not reduce, the risks of war.

[…] It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today. What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

An excerpt from US President Ronald Reagan’s speech entitled “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security“, 23 March 1983.

A “Star Wars program”: Fiction or Reality?
During the historic speech, Reagan had revealed to the American people that a technologically-advanced missile defense system was being developed, which was later known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Notably, when Reagan was a governor of California in the 1960s he became very interested in the concept of directed-energy weapons (DEWs), which was briefed by physicist Edward Teller. Teller mentioned that DEWs, which included lasers and microwaves, could act as an effective defense against a nuclear attack.

To begin with, SDI became an easy object of derision in the British press. The Guardian reported that there was ‘little hope’ of SDI ever succeeding, and a generally dismissive tone dominated that newspaper, labelling SDI an unrealistic fantasy. Cartoons poked fun at Reagan’s initiative, quickly labelled ‘Star Wars’ by US Senator Ted Kennedy, and reiterated on Time magazine’s front cover in April 1984. Of course, SDI was officially declared to be defensive in nature, which was a useful imaginary to promote.

An excerpt from “NATO and the Strategic Defence Initiative: A Transatlantic History of the Star Wars Programme” by Luc-André Brunet.

On 25 February 1981, President Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 12, known as the Strategic Forces Modernisation Program. The Directive had authorised an improvement of strategic defenses and the development of ‘ballistic missile defense systems’.

The proposed SDI program was a space-based missile defense system that could protect the USA from a large-scale nuclear attack. It involved the use of space-based lasers, which reminded some of the popular science fiction film ‘Star Wars’ by George Lucas. (Interestingly, the trilogy was released in 1977, 1980 and 1983).

Although the program sounded absurd and unrealistic, the Reagan Administration was intent on developing the system to nullify the Soviet Union’s ability to make a first strike, thus giving the USA a chance to end the Cold War.

On the other hand, the Kremlin viewed the SDI as a serious breach to global peace and security as Reagan’s plans signalled the US decision to restart the arms race in the early 1980s.

And critics were certainly correct in predicting that Reagan’s proposal would anger the Soviet Union. Four days after Reagan’s surprise speech, Yuri Andropov (1914-1984), who had replaced Brezhnev, called SDI “irresponsible” and “insane”. He said the initiative was “putting the entire world in jeopardy.” He predicted it would “open the floodgates of a runaway race of all types of strategic arms, both offensive and defensive.”

An excerpt from “America’s Star Wars Program” by Ann Byers.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that Reagan was responsible for the end of the Cold War?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the End of the Cold War. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

What is the Chiang Mai Initiative?

Topic of Study[For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Economic Development after Independence
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 2: Asian Financial Crisis

The Asian Financial Crisis: A regional solution
In view of the disastrous impacts caused by the Asian Financial Crisis, member states of the regional organisation ASEAN gathered to discuss the possible responses to mitigate the adverse impacts.

On 6 May 2022, ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea gathered in Chiang Mai, Thailand, to discuss the creation of a network of bilateral currency swap agreements. The meeting took place as part of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Participants were described as “ASEAN+3” (APT).

But very soon, particularly in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, the APT evolved into an institutionalized forum of consultation and cooperation between ASEAN and three Northeast Asian powers over a growing range of regional issues, including economic cooperation, financial and monetary cooperation, social and human resource development, scientific and technical development, culture, information, development, political and security areas, and various transnational issues.

An excerpt from “The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Explaining Regional Economic Integration in East Asia” by Kevin G. Cai.

The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
The Initiative was introduced to avert a similar disaster. The ASEAN+3 members also proposed the creation of a pool of foreign exchange reserves, which will be accessible by participating central banks to stave off currency speculation.

A most important achievement of the APT in the wake of the Asian financial crisis seemed to be the introduction of the Chiang Mai initiative (CMI) in 2000, which led to the establishment of a system of 15 bilateral currency swap arrangements among APT member states plus ASEAN swap arrangement that was designed to improve regional financial stability. Efforts were then made to multilateralize the CMI by converting bilateral swap arrangements into a common funding pool of foreign exchange reserves.

An excerpt from “The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Explaining Regional Economic Integration in East Asia” by Kevin G. Cai.

The APT conference had officiated the “Asian Currency Cooperation Plan”, which functioned on two paths. First, a currency exchange agreement was developed to allow the exchange of financial information. Second, a supervising institution was set up to prevent possible currency crises through close coordination between central banks of partner nations.

The present exchange agreement implies, in fact, that Japan works as the supplier of currency in international exchange. Japan and Korea can mutually exchange $7 billion in dollar-Korean won; Japan and Thailand signed a U.S. dollar-baht exchange agreement worth $3 billion; Japan and the Philippines reached an agreement worth $3 billion; Japan and Malaysia reached agreement to exchange $3.5 billion;

An excerpt from “Co-design for a New East Asia After the Crisis” by Hitoshi Hirakawa and Young-Ho Kim.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that Southeast Asian governments were effective in their responses to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about Asian Financial Crisis. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

What is the significance of the Geneva Accords of 1954?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Cold War (1945-1991)
Section A: Source-based Case Study
Theme I Chapter 2: A World Divided by the Cold War – Manifestations of the global Cold War: Vietnam War (1959-75)

Topic of Study [For H1 History Students]:
Essay Questions
Theme III Chapter 1: The Cold War and Southeast Asia (1945-1991): Factors shaping the Second Indochina War (1959–1975)

Historical Context
From 1946 to 1954, the French colonial power fought against the Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh. The United States backed the French due to fears of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, given the Communist leanings of the Vietnamese forces.

The decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu in March 1954 ended with the French defeat. As a result, the French withdrew from Vietnam.

The repercussions of Dien Bien Phu were swiftly felt around the world. Charles de Gaulle had always been adamant that the loss of Indochina would spell the end of the French empire.

[…] Nonetheless, Indochina’s nationalists achieved almost all their goals with the Geneva Accords of 21 July 1954. Cambodia and Laos had their independence recognized, while Vietnam was divided along the 17th Parallel. This created a formal ceasefire line, which accepted communist control of the north but not the south. Washington was far from happy with this latter concession. To some, it looked like Korea all over again.

An excerpt from “Dien Bien Phu (Cold War 1945–1991)” by Anthony Tucker-Jones.

The Geneva Conference
On 26 April 1954, the United States, Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China, France and Great Britain gathered in Geneva, Switzerland to discuss the future of Indochina and outstanding matters from the Korean War that ended in an armistice a year ago.

In July, the Geneva Agreement were signed. There were three key takeaway points from the Agreement:

  1. The French withdrew their forces from northern Vietnam
  2. Vietnam would be divided at the 17th Parallel temporarily
  3. Elections to be held within two years to select a president and reunify Vietnam

The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot.

An excerpt from the Geneva Agreements, 20-21 July 1954.

Ho Chi Minh signed the agreement, but not the United States. Some American officials expressed concerns that the election outcome may not be in their favour, given Ho’s popularity. As such, the US government propped up an anti-Communist government in South Vietnam.

In October 1956, the Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed by President Ngo Dinh Diem, who replaced the French-backed puppet Emperor Bao Dai.

Shortly thereafter, the [Eisenhower] administration affirmed its commitment to the containment of communist influence in Southeast Asia by signing the Manila Pact, which provided for the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Fatefully, it also began a comprehensive aid program, jointly with the French at first, to prop up the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon as a bulwark against communist expansion in Vietnam. Soon Americans were training Diem’s fledgling armed forces and becoming otherwise more directly involved in Indochina.

An excerpt from “Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965” by Pierre Asselin.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that political factors were most significant in influencing the start of the Vietnam War in the 1960s?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Vietnam War, Korean War and Cuban Missile Crisis. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

What was the Singing Revolution in Estonia?

Topic of Study [For H2 and H1 History Students]: 
Paper 1: Understanding the Cold War (1945-1991)
Section A: Source-based Case Study
Theme I Chapter 3: End of Bipolarity

Historical context: Oppression
For centuries, the Baltic Republics like Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were under Soviet occupation. Under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed by Hitler and Stalin in 1939, the Soviet Union conquered these Baltic republics. Although there was armed resistance (‘Forest Brothers‘) in the early post-WWII years, the Soviets have successfully put them down by 1953.

People joined the resistance movement not as an indication of social rank, but from a desire to stand up against the foreign power that had conquered their homeland. The young people raised in their own free country refused to accept a future without a free and independent Estonia. Most of the population reacted to the invaders instinctively with resistance.

An excerpt from “War in the Woods: Estonia’s Struggle for Survival, 1944-1956” by Mart Laar and Tina Ets.

From 1950s to the 1970s, Estonia went through a policy a ‘Russification‘, which suppressed Estonian culture. By law, nationalist sentiments were suppressed, including attempts to fly the Estonian flag.

A decade of change: Rise to the occasion
When Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power in March 1985, his twin reforms in the form of perestroika and glasnost have created the impetus for Estonians to push for political reforms.

By the mid-1980s, the Estonians have organised themselves and took part in a non-violent movements, demanding for independence. Given that Estonia was known for its culturally rich tradition, the people gathered in large numbers, breaking into song. This was known as the ‘Singing Revolution‘.

The campaign for independence was not just political, but born from a desire to protect and promote nationhood through language, culture and music. Estonia, like the other Baltic States, had a long history of song festivals and large open-air concerts, which brought the nation together. In May 1988 an open-air rock concert in the university town of Tartu became the first place where the black, blue and white colours of the previously banned Estonian national flag were waved. Soon, national singing competitions were occasions for spontaneous mass singing of patriotic songs.

An excerpt from “The Cold War: A New Oral History of Life Between East and West” by Bridget Kendall.

In particular, the people sang national songs that were not allowed since the Soviet occupation. In May and June 1988, the singing was led by musicians, who inspired thousands of attendees that joined hands and reciprocated in unison.

In September 1988, nearly 300,000 people attended a large-scale song festival in the capital Tallinn. There were calls for the restoration of Estonian independence.

The tipping point: Declaration of sovereignty
By then, the ruling Communist Party of Estonia also called for greater political autonomy. On 16 November 1988, the government asserted Estonia’s sovereignty, putting an end to the longstanding Soviet occupation in Estonia. The final stage of the Cold War had finally arrived.

On 16 November 1988, the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic adopted a “Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR,” its first major step toward independence. Moscow declared this move unconstitutional but was not prepared to use force to overturn the Estonian government. By the time the Kremlin formally accepted economic autonomy for the Baltic states, in January 1989, public opinion was rapidly shifting towards independence. The autonomy offered by Gorbachev in early 1991, couched in a new Union Treaty, was considered to be fake and a desperate attempt to keep the USSR together.

An excerpt from “Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-communist Era: A Guide to Politics in the Post-communist Era” by Janusz Bugajski.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– Assess the view that popular movements were the main cause of the End of Bipolarity.

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the End of the Cold War. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.

What is the Look East Policy of Malaysia?

Topic of Study [For H2 History Students]:
Paper 2: Economic Development after Independence
Section B: Essay Writing
Theme II Chapter 1: Paths to Economic Development

Historical context: Learning from the best
Six months after Dr. Mahathir assumed the role as the Prime Minister of Malaysia, his administration launched the ‘Look East Policy‘ in February 1982, which called upon Malaysians to emulate the Japanese work ethic and business management techniques. By doing so, the government aims to acquire Japanese expertise and capital through bilateral trade and investment.

To Mahathir, the definition of ‘East’ consisted of Japan and South Korea. Interesting, Taiwan and Singapore were not being raised as case study references.

Mahathir also mentioned two features which Malaysia proposed to adopt from the Japanese model. One was the concept of Malaysia Incorporated, intended to encourage business owners and workers in the public and private sectors to work together. Another was to create large companies based on the Japanese sogo shoshas (the large trading companies), although in Malaysia these were not developed as rapidly as the Prime Minister would have wished.

An excerpt from “Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir” by Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne.

Two-pronged approach
The ‘Look East Policy’ had two parts. First, Malaysians studied at the Japanese universities. Second, trainees worked at Japanese industries. The program was mainly financed by the Malaysian government, while the Japanese counterpart deployed Japanese trainers and covered part of the expenditure.

No one can dispute that Japan achieved a miracle when it rebuilt itself after the war. How did it do it? It did it by not being advised by other people. It did it in its own way. The only advice it accepted was to produce high quality goods, goods of world standards, so as to be accepted by the world markets. The rest was entirely Japanese.

[…] Japan has been censured for the close cooperation between the government and the corporations. Japan incorporated was regarded as some kind of cronyism involving the government and the private sector. Malaysia sees nothing wrong in the close collaboration between government and the private sector. The government should help the private sector to succeed because a large chunk of the profits made by the private sector belongs to the government. In helping the private sector the government is actually helping itself.

An excerpt from a speech by Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, on “Look East Policy – The Challenges for Japan in a Globalized World“, in 2002, marking the 20th anniversary of the ‘Look East Policy’.

Dr. Mahathir held a firm belief that the ‘Look East Policy’ was vital in realising his Vision 2020, an aim to transform Malaysia into fully developed nation by doubling the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) every decade between 1990 and 2020. Japan was identified as a integral role to fulfil this national aim.

A pipedream in the making?
However, government efforts to emulate the successful Japanese model were obstructed by several factors. One such problem was the cultural differences. For instance, the Japanese employees have adapted to long working hours, but there was resistance from the Malaysians.

Another issue was related to the differences in economic development. While Japan was a pro-Capitalist developed nation, Malaysia was still in the process of transforming from a developing nation to a newly-industrialised economy.

The application of the ‘Look East Policy’ can be traced to the establishment of the Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) in 1980, which was also key feature in Mahathir’s policymaking in the 1980s. With the help of a team of United Nations development experts, HICOM formed companies, such as the Proton Saga national car project (Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional) and the Perwaja Terengganu steel mill.

While still Minister of Trade and Industry, Mahathir contacted Mitsubishi, apparently without sounding out any other possible Japanese partners, and reached agreement with Mitsubishi.

[…] There seems to have been reluctance to make use of knowledgeable Chinese in the Proton project. However, on marketing and selling, the government relied on existing Chinese firms. There was some truth in comments that the Proton was not really a Malaysian car, but a Japanese car with a Malaysian “chop” (name). In 1994 Mahathir accepted this, admitting that Malaysia would not have the know-how to produce a fully fledged car for ten to fifteen years.

An excerpt from “Malaysian Politics Under Mahathir” by Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne.

What can we learn from this article?
Consider the following question:
– How far do you agree that external actors were more important than domestic actors in promoting economic development of Southeast Asian states?

Join our JC History Tuition to learn more about the Paths to Economic Development. The H2 and H1 History Tuition feature online discussion and writing practices to enhance your knowledge application skills. Get useful study notes and clarify your doubts on the subject with the tutor. You can also follow our Telegram Channel to get useful updates.

We have other JC tuition classes, such as JC Math Tuition and JC Chemistry Tuition. For Secondary Tuition, we provide Secondary English Tuition, Secondary Math tuition, Secondary Chemistry Tuition, Social Studies Tuition, Geography, History Tuition and Secondary Economics Tuition. For Primary Tuition, we have Primary English, Math and Science Tuition. Call 9658 5789 to find out more.